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This study analyzes debates conducted at the Finnish parliament between the years 2001 and 
2011 to find out key causal mechanisms that impacted Finland‟s decision to join the Ottawa 
Convention banning anti-personnel landmines in 2012. The study found empirical support for 
both constitutive and constraining effects which were necessary but not alone sufficient 
conditions for the decision. Without the left wing parties being receptive to moral persuasion 
there would not have been enough political will to push the issue forward and without peer 
pressure stemming from other countries and the ability of international institutions to lock in 
domestic decisions it is highly unlikely that the right wing parties would have yielded to 
accept the treaty. In the absence of the latter two, the right wing parties would not have been 
able to justify the accession decision.  
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Introduction 
At a conference organized 6 September 2007 by the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies in Washington, the Defence Minister of Finland Jyri Häkämies made the following 
remark: “given our geographical location, the three main security challenges for Finland today 
are Russia, Russia and Russia.”1 Taking the perception of security challenges and 
geographical proximity with Russia into consideration this study asks the following research 
question: Why did Finland abandon cheap and effective antipersonnel landmines and joined 
the Ottawa Convention in 2012? This puzzle is incomprehensible from a realist paradigm of 
international relations. For all realist politics is organized in groups, individuals and groups 
act egoistically and the main motor is self-interest. The world is an anarchic self-help system 
and power politics and security are the main motives for state behavior.
2
 While classical 
realists see the main aim of states to be power, neorealists see it to be security.
3
 Some states, 
such as Canada, Belgium and Germany, did not use AP landmines during the time the Ottawa 
treaty came to the international political agenda, thus those states did not have any problems 
in signing the treaty.
4
 For Finland however, landmines have always been an integral part of 
the defence doctrine.  
Realists would understand if the incentive to abandon landmines would stem from power 
politics. For example the balance of threat or defensive realist‟s such as Walt, claim that states 
aim to balance in opposition to the principal source of danger. States can also bandwagon with 
the principal source of danger, like Finland did during the Cold War, thus the term 
“Finlandization”. Bandwagoning can happen for two reasons, either for defensive purposes, 
as a form of appeasement, or for offensive purposes, to share the spoils of victory. An 
important variable for Walt is proximity to the principal source of danger.
5
 Finland is situated 
next to Russia, but there are no pressures stemming from the Big Bear to ban landmines, after 
all Russia is one of the countries that has not joined the Ottawa Convention. A realist 
paradigm cannot give a satisfying explanation for why Finland joined the Ottawa treaty 
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because of two reasons. First, because of the geographic proximity, and the perception of 
security challenges, the military utility of landmines is clear. Second, there is no talk that 
Finland would have done the landmine decision as an appeasement for Russia. Realism 
downplays the role of institutions, and labels them as an arena of low politics. In high politics, 
for example in security and defense, institutions are not relevant, as example Mearheimer 
argues.
6
 Most institutionalists share the premise of states being rationally calculating actors 
and institutions are rules that constrain behavior. Neoliberal institutionalism sees that 
autonomous and self-interested actors create problems, and institutions are needed to 
overcome the collective action problem. For example when states play a prisoner‟s dilemma 
type of games over and over again, institutions create institutional memory which helps to 
monitor compliance.
7
 Neo-libearalism is better at understanding the accession of Finland, but 
still fall short giving a convincing explanation because of its reliance on the distribution of 
power and material resources. Neo-liberal institutionalism does not account why interests 
evolved in the first place.  
This study examines the accession of Finland from a sociological, or “constructivist”, 
perspective. Sociological approach does not refute rationality, but treats institutions as 
intervening variables between actor preferences and policy outcomes. Institutions are not only 
formal rules stipulated in the treaties of international organizations that constrain behavior, but 
also norms and behavioral conventions matter.
8
 It thus refutes the solely material and power 
based approaches. The main difference between material, or utility, based approaches and 
sociological approach is ontological. While utility based approaches treat interests as 
exogenously given, such as maximization of security or economic wellbeing, sociological 
approach treats interests as endogenous: interests are shaped through interaction and are 
constantly evolving.  Institutions can thus change actor interests and even identity and 
transform the logic of action from utility calculation to logic of appropriateness that stem 
from identity. In the case of antipersonnel landmines, the use of landmines, despite their 
military utility and economic efficiency, was no longer seen as an appropriate behavior for a 
state which identifies itself as a developed western state and member of the European Union. 
                                                          
6
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7
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8
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This study is interested in why Finland joined the Ottawa Convention. The constructivist 
norms literature, and also literature handling specifically landmines, emphasizes two 
mechanisms. First is moral persuasion. Some actors might be morally persuaded to change 
their perception of a certain issue, such as mines, when they face new information. This can 
be also understood in terms of social learning. This mechanism is constitutive. In the case of 
landmines, the international civil society was able to set the issue on the international political 
agenda, by framing landmines from a military and security issue to humanitarian problem. 
This was possible because of the political opportunity structure provided by international 
humanitarian law, and especially the long standing principles of jus in bello, which requires 
civilian populations to be protected during conflict and that gains of a military action needs to 
the proportional by not causing unnecessary harm or suffering. The second is a more 
constraining mechanism. This mechanism is based on emulation and peer pressures that stem 
from identity. Actor may not have been morally persuaded, or internalized a new norm, but 
because of a given identity, such as a developed western state, it does not see that certain 
behavior is appropriate.  
This study uses process tracing as its primary method to find out which of these two 
mechanisms played a role in the Finnish decision to join the Ottawa Convention. The issue is 
contemporary, since the landmine decision was made in November 2011. This study will 
tackle the issue by looking at justification made in the general debates conducted at the 
parliament during a ten year time span, in connection to the adoption of Finnish Security and 
Defence Policies (FSDP) 2001, 2004 and 2009 and the final government proposal of 2011. In 
addition, this study looks at justification presented for and against landmines in the FSDP‟s 
and in relevant Committee Memorandums. If the parliament votes on the issues, the relevant 
voting results are also presented. 
By looking at the justification one can start to piece together the primary motor in Finland‟s 
landmine decision. In a parliamentary setting, actors, individual MPs and party groups, need 
to justify their decisions. Official justifications are not enough, since it is clear that the Ottawa 
Convention is already a well established institution with clearly stipulated principles. From 
the debates the researcher can extract the causal claims actors see as the reason for joining, 
but also not joining. Justifications are divided into two main categories, for and against, with 
two subcategories in each. In the “against” category there are security and economic 
justifications, the “for” category contains constitutive and constraining mechanisms.  
6 
 
This study has four parts. The first section goes through the constructivist norm theory and 
largely follows the work of Martha Finnemore. The second part summarizes the development 
process of the specific norm against antipersonnel landmines. The third part handles the 
methodology, case selection, concepts, variables, and their operationalization. The fourth part 
goes through the case of Finland. Each subsection of the case study goes trough first the 
general debate conducted at the parliament and lists the argument frequency. Next the relevant 
committee memorandums are handled, followed by possible voting results. The last 
subsection, “Accession and Decision,” goes first trough the Government proposal, the general 
debate, followed by a Committee Statement and voting results. After a narrative of the process 
is drawn, the last subsection of part four discusses the findings. 
The analysis found empirical support for constitutive and constraining mechanisms. Both, 
however, were necessary but not alone sufficient conditions for the decision. Without the left 
wing parties being receptive to moral persuasion and a new type of framing in the case of 
landmines, there would not have been enough political will to push the issue forward in the 
parliamentary agenda; and without peer pressure stemming from other countries and the 
ability of international institutions to lock in domestic decision, it is unlikely that the right 
wing parties would have ever yielded to favor the accession.  
1. Theoretical framework 
There is a vast constructivist literature that challenges the premises of material based 
approaches. Price argues that “neo-liberalism is ill-suited to account for developments such as 
the unilateral renunciation of mines by dozens of states even before a widely accepted 
international treaty seemed likely.”9 Neoliberalism, like realism, assumes interests as 
exogenous and “privileges the state as the key site of agency, whereas the case at hand [AP 
landmines] the key impetus for normative change lies in processes engendered by 
transnational and nonstate sources of agency that generate interests.”10 
The main difference between the material and power based approaches and constructivism is 
ontological. Both neorealism and neoliberalism assume that actors drive to maximize their 
utility. Interests are exogenously given, such as the aim to maximize power, security or 
economic wellbeing. They do not address why such interest were evolved in the first place. 
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This also has some methodological implications which are further elaborated in the 
methodology section.  
Norm is usually defined as a “standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given 
identity”11 There are several categories of norms, most common being constitutive and 
regulative.
12
 Constitutive norms “create new actors, interests, or categories of action.”13 
Sovereignty is such a constitutive norm that has created a bundle of others norms, such as the 
regulative, action constraining norm of non intervention.  Third, often neglected, category is 
prescriptive norm, it is a norm that demands action.
14
 The constitutive norm category and the 
constitutive mechanism used to label a variable category in this study should not be mixed.  
Norms are not material, but still very real. Norms can be recognized not only by conforming 
but also by nonconforming behavior. For instance when a state is forced to justify its use of 
landmines, it is evidence that such a norm against landmines does exist. If it would not exist, 
state would not need to justify its behavior.  
How norms matter differs through the life cycle of the norm.
15
 The life cycle can be divided 
into three stages: norm emergence, cascade and internalization. The tipping point between 
stage one and stage two refers to “a critical mass of relevant state actors” who accept the 
norm.
16
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Norm life cycle
17
 
During the emergence stage norms entrepreneurs have a crucial role. A well known example 
is the case of the Swiss Henry Dunant, who is credited to be behind the International 
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 Finnemore, M., Sikkink, K. (1998). International Norms Dynamics and Political Change – International 
Organization, 52(4), 887-917. 
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Committee of the Red Cross. In the case of the landmines, the name of Judy Williams is often 
raised to the front. She who received, together with the International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines, a Nobel Peace Prize for her efforts in 1997.
18
 Norm entrepreneurs create new 
issues by framing them in a new way. Example landmines were framed as a humanitarian 
issue; instead a matter of traditional security and defense approach.
19
 An important factor 
enabling the framing is the organizational platform.
20
 If the norm does not originate from a 
state or a state led institution, for example UN or WTO, the institutional platform is often a 
NGO organized around a specific issue such as human rights or environment, for example 
Greenpeace and Amnesty International. These organizations can form dense international 
networks, or “transnational advocacy networks”, with other related NGOs, think tanks and 
experts that rally around the same issue. An example of such a network is also the 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines. 
When the norm has emerged to the international agenda and norm entrepreneurs have, with 
the help of some organizational platform such as NGO network, persuaded and pressured 
critical mass of states to support the norm, a tipping point occurs.
21
  A tipping point is cited 
not to occur before minimum of one-third of all states have adopted the norm.
22
 In the 
landmines case, by May 1997 states that supported the Ottawa treaty reached sixty. By 
December of the same year, 124 countries had ratified the treaty. 
The mechanism in the second stage is different than in the first. While in the first stage the 
dominant mechanism was reframing the issue by norm entrepreneurs, now the dominant 
method is socialization through peer pressure. Socialization is defined as the “induction of 
new members… into the ways of behavior that are preferred in the society”.23 Finnemore 
argue that the socialization mechanisms “redefine appropriate behavior for the identity called 
“state” or some relevant subset of states such as “liberal” state or a European state.”24 
There are two main mechanisms of how norms socialize new actors.  For example Price 
argues that from the vast amount of mechanisms “the role of moral persuasion” and “the 
                                                          
18
 Price 1998, 618. 
19
 Ruthenford, K.R. (2000). The Evolving Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of NGOs in Banning 
Antipersonnel Landmines – World Politics, 53(1), 110. 
20
 Finnemore et al 1998, 899. 
21
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24
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social pressure arising from identity politics and emulation are particularly crucial”.25 Also 
Jeffrey Checkel distinguishes two mechanisms. First follows the idea of moral persuasion, 
Checkel labels this constitutive: “Norms are internalized and constitute a set of shared 
intersubjective understanding that make behavioral claims”.26 The second is constraining in 
which the “non-state actors and policy networks are united in their support for a particular 
norm; they mobilize and coerce decision makers, who then instrumentally adopt” the norm.27 
The first is the dominant mechanism in the first stage of the norm life cycle, and can also be 
understood as framing; second can be understood as peer pressure among states. Finnemore 
gives three main motives for this pressure: legitimation, conformity and esteem. 
Legitimacy is a concept that is relational. In a democracy it stems from the people. A state‟s 
legitimacy in international society comes from other states. States can care about their 
international legitimacy also because it contributes to the domestic legitimacy of the state in 
the eyes of its citizens.
28
 Membership in an institution works as a stamp that state acquires 
when it fulfills the requirement prescribed by the norm. Institutions restrain and “affect both 
of locking in domestic changes and of making credible a domestic commitment to a particular 
policy path.”29 Institutions also give legitimacy to certain policy choice by giving political 
cover.
30
 Esteem refers to the image of the state; state leaders want others to “to think well on 
themselves”.31 Finland has been an advocate of humanitarian assistance for a long time and 
this can be argued to be the image that Finland wants to preserve. Conformity refers to peers. 
Norm conformity is a social proof that a state belongs to a certain group. 
32
 Quoting Axelrod 
“By conforming to the actions of those around us, we fulfill a psychological need to be part of 
a group.”33  
                                                          
25
 Price 1998, 616. 
26
 Checkel, J. (1997). International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist Constructivist Divide 
– European Journal of International Relations, 3, 477. 
27
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 Finnemore et al 1998, 903. 
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 Stein, A.A. (2006). Neoliberal Institutionalism. / In The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. Snidal, 
D., Reus-Smit, C. (eds). Oxford: Oxford University press, 215. See also Grigorescu, A. (2003). International 
Organizations and Government Transparency: Linking the International and Domestic Realms. – International 
Studies Quarterly, 47, 643-67. 
30
 Franck, T.M. (1988). Legitimacy in International System – American Journal of International Law, 82, 705-
59.; and Hurd, I. (1999). Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics – International Organization, 53, 
379-408. 
31
 Finnemore et al 1998, 903. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Axelrod, R. (1986). An Evolutionary Approach to Norms – The American Political Science Review, 80(4), 
1105. 
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The theoretical approach of this study can be labeled as sociological institutionalism. 
Institutions can be understood as intervening variables between actor preferences and policy 
outcomes. However both actor preferences and institutions are in constant interaction with 
each other. This is the main criticism of constructivist based approaches towards 
neoliberalism and neorealism, which treats interests as exogenous. Interests are in constant 
change, and only by looking at the interests over time one can start to piece together more 
accurate picture of the social reality and understand change. This approach does not refute 
rationality. States and other actors, such as political parties, can act rationally, but they do it 
from their respected view of what is the interest. Interest are however conditional to the 
prevailing historical and cultural context. If an actor strives to maximize its utility for 
example, it is also behavior that the actor is socialized in. Methodologically interests can be 
pieced together by looking at the justification of actors. These can be found from statements 
of heads of states, declarations of international organizations such as United Nations, or 
debates conducted at international meetings, or as in this study, at the national parliaments. 
2. Development of the International Norm against Anti-personnel Landmines 
Anti-personnel landmines (APL) are “designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or 
contact of a person and will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.”34 Landmines left 
in the terrain cannot distinguish civilians from soldiers and are active for decades if not taken 
out. APLs are very cheap and cost efficient. Despite the international efforts mines still cause 
problem in the developing world. In 2010 there were 4191 new casualties in an affected area 
of 72 states.
35
 This was despite 157 (the number of countries in 2012 is 159) countries having 
joined the Ottawa Treaty, comprising of approximately 80 percent of the states in the world.
36
 
There are still 12 countries that produce landmines as of 2011: China, Cuba, India, Iran, 
Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, United States and 
Vietnam.
37
 
The effort to ban APLs is not a new phenomenon but an almost universal ban was not likely 
until very recently in the mid 1990s. This section provides an overview of the background of 
the ban from Geneva till Ottawa. 
                                                          
34
 Ottawa Convention, Article II. WWW: www.icbl.org/treaty/text/english (Last Accessed 3 May 2012) 
35
 Landmine Monitor Report 2011 / International Campaign to Ban Landmines WWW: www.the-
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36
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37
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2.1. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons  
The ban on landmines is based on international humanitarian law,
38
 which in this case can be 
traced back to the long established literature of just war tradition. Just war refers to literature 
that handles moral aspects of warfare and gives criteria for “judging whether a war is just and 
whether it is fought by just means.”39 There are two branches in just war tradition. The first 
category handles jus ad bellum, before the war, the second jus in bello, during the war. The 
latter category is an important one for the landmines case. Important criteria in jus in bello are 
discrimination: “[f]orce must never be applied in such a way as to make noncombatants and 
innocent person the intentional objects of attack. The only appropriate targets in war are 
combatants”, and proportionality: “[t]he quantity of force employed or threatened must 
always be morally proportionate to the end being sought in war”.40 The just war tradition is 
old, but the landmines case can be viewed to have started some time after the World War II. 
In 1956 the International Committee of the Red Cross made draft rules, to improve the 
protection of civilian population.
41
 This was the first time landmines were specifically 
stipulated as a problem weapon because of their indiscriminate nature.
 42
  
It was not however until the 1974 that a Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and 
Development of International Law Applicable in armed Conflicts was held in Geneva. In 
1977 two protocols were opened for signature. 
43
 From the vantage point of landmines, these 
protocols reinforced two main principles of humanitarian law. First, conflicting parties have 
to separate civilians from soldiers.
44
 Second, the means of violence has legal limits.
45
 This is 
argued to be the base for the “political opportunity structure” which enables addressing 
landmines.
46
 During the conference, an expert group of nineteen countries, with the help of 
ICRC, convened three times to talk which conventional weapons are indiscriminate in nature. 
However, because of these certain weapon categories could lead to controversy if specified, 
                                                          
38
 Cottrell, M.P. (2009). Legitimacy and Institutional Replacement: The Convention of Certain Conventional 
Weapons and the Emergence of the Mine Ban Treaty – International Organization, 63, 227. 
39
 Fixdal, M, Smith, D. (1998). Humanitarian intervention and Just War – Mershon International Studies Review, 
42(2), 285. 
40
 Phillips, R.L. (1984) War and Justice. / Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 12-13. 
41
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1956. WWW: www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/420?OpenDocument (Last Accessed 3 May 2012) 
42
 Cotrell 2009, 227. 
43
 Ibid, 228 
44
 Article 51 of Protocol I (1977) 
45
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46
 Cotrell 2009, 228.  
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the conference moved the talks to the UN.
47
 The UN approved this move in 1977 and stated 
that “Convinced that the suffering of civilian populations and combatants could be 
significantly reduced if general agreement can be attained on the prohibition or restriction for 
humanitarian reasons of the use of specific conventional weapons, including any which may 
be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects…”48 The resolution 
further acknowledged the work of the ICRC by “Recalling that the issue of prohibitions of the 
use of specific conventional weapons has been the subject of substantive discussion for a 
number of years, notably at the sessions of the Conference of Government Experts on the Use 
of Certain Conventional Weapons held, under the auspices of the International Committee of 
the Red Cross.”49  Finally a UN conference gathered in Geneva in 1979 and 1980 and 
concluded the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate 
Effects.
50
  
The ban on landmines however is in contradiction with the other criterion, proportionality, 
and consequently the argument that the humanitarian consequences do not exceed the military 
utility, has been present ever since. Landmines have a military utility, as it is evident from the 
statements made by experts at the Diplomatic Conferences: “use of antipersonnel mines is a 
generally accepted means of hampering enemy advance.”51 Another expert report state that 
APLs are “most cost-efficient system” that the military can use.52  
Compromise was arrived in the negotiations and landmines were decided to be regulated. 
Protocol II defined landmines and other related traps. It prohibited the use of landmines 
against civilian populations in any circumstances and defined the area where landmines could 
be used only to an area “which contains military objectives” and where their place could be 
“accurately recorded” or that the devices would have a “neutralizing mechanism”.53 The 
CCW came available for signatures in 1980 and came into force in 1983. 
The CCW had several problems. Cotrell example lists that it did not regulate production, sale 
or possession of landmines. There were no enforcement or verification mechanisms such as 
                                                          
47
 Maresca, L., Maslen, S. (2000). The Banning of Anti-Personnel Landmines: The Legal Contribution of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, 1955-1999. / Cambridge: Cambridge University press.  
48
 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 32/152 (1977) 
49
 Ibid. 
50
 Maresca et al 2000, 90.  
51
 Ibid, 89. 
52
 Ibid, 317. 
53
 CCW Protocol II, Article V 
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review conferences on compliance. In addition the treaty text was vague. Cotrell gives an 
example of the “military objective”: states could decide themselves if the use of landmines 
have military objective or not. This gave plenty of room for reinterpretation.
54
  
In sum, when the issue was adopted by the UN, it became a conventional arms control 
negotiations where state parties negotiated with each other. States were the primary actors, 
and were reluctant to bind themselves to strict international agreements that would constrain 
their actions in the field of security. However, this was about to change.  
2.2. Towards Ottawa 
The signing of the Ottawa treaty in 1997 is unique in many ways. The process involved a 
wide variety of non-state actors in addition to governments. In this process, the International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines was instrumental. Ruthenford demonstrates how NGOs were 
able to mold the international political agenda through two stage process.
55
 The first stage is 
called “cognitive agenda setting”; the second is called “norm agenda setting”.56 The first 
brought landmines issue to the international attention, the second changed the conception of 
landmines. This process can be placed into the first “norm emergence” stage of the norm life 
cycle.  
Ruthenford divides the two stages into three categories: framing, schema and priming. 
Framing refers to the building blocks that are used to describe certain issue.
57
 These building 
blocks are used to “promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.”58 Schema connects to 
framing, but reduces transaction costs people face when handling complicated information. 
Schema simplifies frames to a level that can be managed. Priming activates the schemas. 
Table two summarizes these components in both levels. 
 
 
                                                          
54
 Cotrell 2009, 230. 
55
 Ruthenford 2000. 
56
 Ibid, 78. 
57
 Ibid. 
58
 Entman, R. (1989). Democracy without Citizens: Media and the Decay of American Politics. / New York: 
Oxford University Press. Quoted from Ruthenford 2000, 78.  
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Agenda-Setting 
Components 
Level One: Cognitive 
Agenda Setting 
Level Two: Norm Agenda 
Setting 
Framing Landmines as a new issue: 
getting people to think 
about landmines as a 
humanitarian issue 
Horrible effects and 
disproportionate 
consequences 
Schema Outrageous landmine 
statistics 
Leadership games to 
control the landmine issue 
Priming Landmine victim stories Incoherent arguments 
among anti-ban states 
 
Table 2: NGO Agenda Setting and Landmines
59
 
The CCW discussed previously received only small international attention, and only fifty-two 
states had ratified it.
60
 Because of the slow progress of the CCW, the International Campaign 
to Ban Landmines was established in 1991. The campaign was launched in October 1992 with 
a joint effort of six NGOs: Handicap International, France; Human Rights Watch, United 
States; Medico international, Germany; Mines Advisory group, United Kingdom; Physicians 
for Human Rights, United States and the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation.
61
 First 
international landmine conference was held in May 1993. The key tactic of the ICBL, 
according to Ruthenford, was to reframe the landmines as a humanitarian issue.  
NGOs started to promote grim statistics. In the mid 1990s landmines killed twenty-six 
thousand people yearly, of which roughly 80 percent were civilians.
62
 Because landmines do 
not always kill, the number of amputees in problem countries is big. In 1991 for example, 
Cambodia had thirty thousand amputees among a population of 8.5 million plus an additional 
five thousand amputees in refugee camps at the border of Thailand.
63
 As an indicator of the 
magnitude, NGOs compared landmines with other taboo weapons: more people had died or 
injured by landmines than by biological, chemical or nuclear weapons.
64
 
The priming phase was conducted with landmine victim stories. This was done to wake up 
policymakers and give faces to the statistics. Since landmines do not always kill, but often 
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amputate, pictures of victims were used. This fact also pointed out the idea of the utility of 
landmines: by not killing but only injuring, landmines would tie up more enemy resources. 
Landmines were also reported to have impacts on marginalized people, for example through 
denying access to agricultural lands which were infected by mines. Example Rae McGrath of 
Mines Advisory group stated that “deaths and injuries caused to innocent people, and the 
denial of ground for agricultural and other civilian purposes as a result of the presence of 
mines made it inevitable that the aid community must face up the issue.”65 
When NGOs had placed the landmine issue on the political agenda, it was time for 
persuasion: “The main thesis is that the more NGOs could convince governments of the 
horrible effects of landmine use, especially the disproportionate civilian casualties, the greater 
the possibility of changing state perception and use of landmines.”66 NGOs framed landmines 
as illegal under the international humanitarian law. This opportunity structure was offered by 
the Geneva Conventions discussed earlier. Landmines were framed not to be proportional. 
Their humanitarian costs outweigh their military utility. Second, they were indiscriminate; 
they could not distinguish civilians from combatants. By breaking the frame from military to 
humanitarian, NGOs were able to give themselves legitimacy to disseminate information. 
Schema in the second stage was concerned with leadership. According to Ruthenford, major 
cleavage was between major powers, especially the USA, and NGOs with their state allies.
67
 
USA continued to argue that landmines were strategically important, for example to maintain 
peace between the two Koreas. However the key individuals were for the landmine ban, such 
as Princess Diana and Nelson Mandela. With their help the issue maintained at the agenda. 
Important aspect was that also the media was more inclined to support the NGOs.
68
 At the 
priming stage, the victim stories again played a role. States were not able to dispute the 
humanitarian arguments presented. Instead the opposing side continued to argue with political 
and military arguments.
69
 This proved not to be successful in many countries.  
The political process of the Ottawa Treaty started in October 1996 when fifty governments 
and twenty-four observers met in Ottawa. The actual treaty was drafted by Austria during 
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1997. In 3 December 1997, 122 countries had signed the treaty. This point can be claimed to 
be a tipping point and mark the change in the norm life cycle from norm emergence to norms 
cascade. According to the theory, the mechanism of how states adopt a norm changes after the 
tipping point has been reached. Now the important variable is no longer the moral persuasion. 
The international pressures play a much bigger role. Finland joined the treaty over twelve 
years after the treaty came into force in 1999. Why did Finland join the Ottawa Treaty? The 
link between the domestic and international level in studying institutions is important. 
Domestic institutions should support the institution.
70
 Did Finland join because political 
parties were morally persuaded into the humanitarian framing, and they viewed the 
humanitarian costs to outweigh the military utility of antipersonnel landmines, or was it 
because of more constraining reasons that stem from identity politics? 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Process Tracing and Primary Sources 
Norms reach the domestic arena through what Jeffrey Checkel calls empowerment. The 
concept refers to the early stage of norm adoption, when the norm is not yet a well established 
behavioral rule.
71
 Empowerment process involves elite decision makers. Norm changing 
discourse or behavior of policy makers is necessary, but not sufficient, condition for norm 
adoption: “elites are „gatekeepers‟ who ultimately control the political agenda”72 
This study is within case analysis that uses process tracing as its method. Because it is 
expected that a single variable does not give a full explanation (see section hypotheses), 
process tracing can be argued to be the appropriate method. In George and Bennett‟s words: 
“Process tracing in single cases… has the capacity for disproving claims that a single variable 
is necessary or sufficient for outcome”.73 Process tracing is also justified because of the 
ontological stance of this research. Interests are not exogenously given, but evolve in time 
through interaction, thus only by finding correlation between given theoretical interest and 
empirical reality in one instance of a time is not sufficient.  
This study looks at justifications of the decision to join the Ottawa Treaty over the course of 
ten years, to find out what were the primary mechanisms that played a role in the decision 
                                                          
70
 Dai, X. (2007). International Institutions and National policies. / Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
71
 Checkel 1997, 476. 
72
 Ibid. 
73
 George, A.L., Bennett, A. (2005). Case studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. / Cambridge: 
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 220. 
17 
 
making process. When an actor makes a decision, in this case a political party or an individual 
MP, the decision needs to be justified. An actor does this by referring to common values or 
held beliefs. These values and beliefs can change across time as discussed in the theory 
section, through the hypothesized constitutive and constraining mechanisms.  
The primary sources used are general debates conducted at the parliament, committee 
memorandums of the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committees and the Finnish Security and 
Defence Policies 2001, 2004 and 2009. These documents can be accessed through the online 
archive of the Finnish parliament.
74
  From these documents the justifications of different 
actors can be drawn.  
3.2. Case Selection 
Finland made the final decision to join the Ottawa Treaty in November 2011, making the case 
contemporary. This study analyzes general debates in the Finnish Parliament. The debates that 
will be analyzed are those in connection to the adoption of the Finnish Security and Defence 
Policy (FSDP). It can be expected that the most viral debate about landmines will be found in 
those parliamentary sessions where FSDP is on the agenda. The debates will then be analyzed 
each time a new policy is adopted until the final decision is made. In total this means four 
debates over the course of 10 years: FSDP 2001, FSDP 2004, FSDP 2009 and the final 
decision of 2011. The 2001 debate is the first instance to be analyzed because it is the first 
time the goal of joining the Ottawa Treaty is officially stipulated in the FSDP. In addition the 
justifications present in the FSDPs and relevant committees are used. During this timeframe 
there are four different governments in place with varying cabinet compositions. 
3.3. Variables, concepts and indicators 
There are two main ways, treated here as independent variables, through which norm 
diffusion is argued to happen according to the norms literature. The mechanisms can be 
summarized into two broad categories: constitutive and constraining. In the constitutive 
category, norm is adopted trough moral persuasion. Actor has been morally persuaded and has 
adopted the new frame in the issue of landmines: landmines are seen as a humanitarian issue 
instead of military and security.  
Norm adoption through constraining mechanism can happen without an actor being morally 
persuaded. Finnemore gives three mechanisms that can be placed under the rubric of 
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constraining: legitimacy, esteem and conformity, as discussed in the theory section. 
Institutions are important in giving legitimacy to a chosen policy path and “lock in” decisions. 
This mechanism is operarationalized by looking at arguments that refer to consistency of 
policy and related past policy choices. Esteem refers to the image of the state: state leaders 
want others to perceive them in a positive light. Conformity is closely related and refers to 
peer groups. Both of these mechanisms are operationalized by looking at justifications that 
refer to number of states that have joined or that certain specific group of states – such as 
“Nordic Countries” or “EU countries” – or statements which refer to statements made by 
other heads of state.  
Variable Indicators 
Constraining 1. Arguments referring to consistency of policy 
2. Arguments referring to reputation/image of Finland  
3. Arguments referring to other states/peer group 
4. Party position towards the Ottawa Treaty changing from 
negative to positive followed by a change in rhetoric 
emphasizing reputational/consistency issues 
Constitutive 1. Arguments presented on humanitarian/moral grounds such as 
civilian victims or harm caused by landmines in other 
countries 
2. Actor (party or individual MP) position towards the Ottawa 
Treaty changing from negative to positive as more information 
comes available, followed by a change in rhetoric emphasizing 
humanitarian/moral issues 
 
Table 3: Variables and indicators 
The main difference between the two variables is that constraining is more instrumental. The 
joining decision is an instrument to obtain a certain other objective, for example the urge to 
belong to a group or being thought well of. Constitutive disregards these other objectives and 
is made because something is perceived as the right thing to do even when facing some costs, 
for example disarmament for its own sake or because of humanitarian reasons. Instrumental 
reasons do not refute the constructivist logic. States react to constraining mechanism because 
they have a certain identity. For example Finland, as a member of the EU and being a Nordic 
country, would react to arguments referring to other EU or Nordic countries differently than 
China would as an Asian and non EU state. Thus certain behavior that is not appropriate for 
Finland can be so to some other country which does not share the same identity.  
19 
 
Arguments will be divided by party lines to find which actors in a given time argued through 
which lines. To identify the party preferences, arguments against the treaty will also be 
investigated. Parties are further divided into opposition and government. If a party changes its 
stance because of moral persuasion, it should be seen in the rhetoric of the party. Similarly, if 
a party changes its stance because of constraining mechanisms, there should be indicators 
found in the rhetoric.  
3.4. Hypotheses: 
H1: Finland joined to the Ottawa Convention because of constraining reasons. 
This option has empirical support if there is minimal to zero indication towards moral 
persuasion in the parliamentary debates. 
H2: Finland joined to the Ottawa Convention because of constitutive reasons. 
This option has empirical support if there is minimal to zero indication towards 
constraint in the parliamentary debates. 
H3: Finland joined to the Ottawa Convention because of a combination of constitutive and 
constraining mechanisms.  
  H3a: Constitutive primary, constraining secondary 
This option has empirical support if both arguments were present, but there was 
more indication towards moral persuasion in the parliamentary debates.  
H3b: Constraining primary, constitutive secondary 
This option has empirical support if both arguments were present, but there was 
more indication towards constraints in the parliamentary debates.  
H1 and H2 are very unlikely. It is expected that both mechanisms play some causal role in the 
foreign policy decision. H3 is thus the most likely hypothesis. Both mechanisms can be 
expected to strengthen as time passes. Moral persuasion can strengthen through time when 
actors are debating against each other and the information is more in the open. On the other 
hand, also constraints can mount as time passes: Finland is seen as an outlier. 
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4. Case Study of Finland 
The First three sections (2001 to 2009) go through the general debates in connection to the 
adoption of the Finnish Security and Defence policy, followed by a Committee Statements of 
either the Defence or Foreign Affairs Committee and finally the possible voting patterns. In 
2011, the general debate is in connection to the government proposal on the Convention on 
the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and 
on their Destruction, followed by Committee statement and the final vote. At each general 
debate sections a table summarizing argument frequency is given. The table is divided into 
opposition and government and argument frequencies are given by party. The table also 
shows how many seats the party has in the parliament out of 200. The table also shows the 
group position made in a group statement, if such statements are given during the debate. 
Note that a single speech can contain number of argument categories, for example both 
security and economic argument. Also, one MP can speak several times during the debate and 
speak against their group position. The translations of each separate argument and the name of 
the speakers can be found at the appendix. 
4.1. The Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2001 
4.1.1. General Debate 2001 
The Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2001 (FSDP 2001) is the first Security and Defence 
Policy that states the goal to join the Ottawa Convention. The previous policy was made in 
1997, before the Ottawa process had finished. In the FSDP 2001 it is stated that “Finland 
supports an effective and global ban on anti-personnel landmines and is participating in the 
EU‟s work to promote the objectives and global implementation of the Ottawa Convention.” 
75
 As a justification of not joining the Ottawa Convention earlier, the FSDP 2001 states that 
“Finland has refrained from acceding to the Ottawa Convention because it does not at the 
moment have the economic or technical means to undertake to destroy the mines banned by 
the Convention and replace with other means”.76 However, the FSDP 2001 does state a goal 
to join the treaty by 2006 and to search for alternative weapon systems: “The work is 
continuing with a view to Finland acceding to the Convention in 2006 and destroying anti-
personnel landmines by the end of 2010…”77, however, the FSDP 2001 leaves a backdoor to 
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the accession by continuing “…without compromising Finland‟s credible defence 
capability.”78 
The coalition government in place during the debate was so called rainbow coalition, 
containing six parties from left to right. The coalition partners were the Social Democratic 
Party (SDP), the center-right National Coalition Party (NCP), the left wing Left Alliance 
(LA), the environmentalist Green Party (GP), the linguistic Swedish People‟s Party (SPP) and 
the center right conservative Christian Democratic Party (CDP). The opposition consisted 
from the agrarian Center Party and the populist True Finns.  
The debate started by a statement by the Defense Minister Jan-Erik Enestam (SPP). Defence 
Minister Enestam re-stated the stance proposed by the government in the FSDP 2001 by 
acknowledging that Finland supports efficient and global ban for landmines and that the goal 
is to join the treaty by the year 2006, leaving however a backdoor that this must be done 
without compromising credible defence.
79
 Defence Minister also stated that the joining and 
replacement systems will be handled again in relation to the 2004 Security and Defence 
Policy. Minister Enestam restated this statement once later in the debate, however now 
emphasizing that the condition of not hampering Finnish defence is a big constraint and that 
replacement systems are very expensive.
80
 Defence Minister was the only one from the SPP to 
bring forth the mine issue during the parliamentary discussion.  
The debate continued with group statements by each parliamentary party group, followed by a 
general debate. The senior coalition member and Prime Ministerial Party, Social Democrats, 
stated that their group views that Finland should join the treaty as soon as possible and that 
this would be in line with Finland‟s line of supporting disarmament and humanitarian 
cooperation. Many MPs from the SDP spoke for the treaty. MP Ilkka Taipale referred to his 
40 year membership in the Committee of Hundred (one of the oldest peace organizations in 
Finland) and the 60‟s generation‟s effort to promote a cultural change towards non-violence. 
MP Taipale stated that FSDP has a realist approach towards landmines and argued that 
nowhere landmine ban had come voluntarily, but only after wide ranging civil campaign.
81
 
MP Piia Viitanen in turn wished for a world without guns, missiles or landmines altogether.
82
 
MP Kimmo Kiljunen invoked controversy among the MPs of the SDP by comparing 
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landmines to chemical weapons. In his view, it is not possible to argue that landmines are 
strategically important to Finland, because then other states could argue in the similar manner. 
MP Kiljunen made an example of Iraq under Saddam Hussein, who could have used the 
argument that chemical weapons are strategically important. International disarmament, 
according to MP Kiljunen, cannot start from an assumption that some weapons are 
strategically important to individual countries.
83
 MP Antero Kekkonen from the SDP rebutted 
that it is unjust to compare the two because landmines were a defensive weapon.
84
 
All SDPs justifications except MP Viitanen‟s, which has an idealist approach towards 
landmines and weapons altogether, can be treated as constraining. The group statement refers 
to the long standing line, meaning previous commitments in other related fields that constrain 
Finnish policy. MP Taipale directly refers to the civil campaign that pressures states. There 
were however members of the parliament in the SDP that were against the treaty. Four MPs 
from the SDP argued against the ban from several angles.  MP Esa Lahtela argued against 
Ottawa Convention on the grounds that banning landmines would promote the interests of gun 
manufacturers and the treaty is only a trick of the military-industrial lobby. According to MP 
Lahtela, banning mines would promote arms race, and that for example the Green Party 
should come along and support the ban of automatic weapons.
85
 MP Matti Vähänäkki gave 
more traditional security argument and referred to Finland‟s geography with forests and lakes 
but also mentioned that Finland has a tradition to evacuate civilians from war zones during 
conflicts.
86
 From this statement it is apparent that the argument of mines being hazardous to 
civilians years after the conflict has ended is not yet well grounded. MP Sakari Smeds used 
the economic argument and stated that instead of using the money on expensive replacement 
systems the funds should rather be used on healthcare or education.
87
 MP Jukka Gustafsson 
directly attacked against the humanitarian argument by stating that Finland should not join the 
treaty because mines do harm in other countries. In his view landmines have a national, 
historical, symbolic and practical value, and that it is also a matter of expenses.
88
 
The second biggest coalition partner, National Coalition Party, was the most vocal opponent 
of the Landmine Ban referring to security arguments five and economic arguments eight times 
during the debate. The group statement of NCP emphasized both the expensiveness of 
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replacing systems and the fact that the ban would compromise Finland‟s defence ability. 
Further justifications were that Finnish mines would not pose danger to civilians but only to 
the invading enemy.
 89
  Based on these arguments NCP viewed that Finland should not place 
strict deadlines for joining.
90
 MPs of the NCP in general viewed landmines as an integral part 
of the territorial defence doctrine and often referred to the geographic location of Finland. MP 
Olli Nepponen example argued that credible defence requires landmines.
91
 However, even 
more important argument was the funding issue. NCP‟s group statement referred to a lack of 
“political will” to increase the defence budget.92 MP Eero Akaan-Penttilä stated that Finland 
has a long border to the east, but also that the GDP and the defence budget of Finland are the 
smallest in the Nordic Countries.
93
 Also the statement of MP Jyrki Katainen brought up the 
issue of apparent lack of “political will” to fund replacing systems.94  
The group statement of the Left Alliance referred to the 140 other states that had at the time 
joined the Ottawa Convention, and regretted that Finland was not among the ones within it.
95
 
MP Annika Lapintie viewed that more important than defence budget is good neighborly 
relations and that the accession date of 2006 should be binding. However, MP Jaakko Laakso 
from the Left Alliance argued against the group stance by stating that landmines are an 
important part of the defence doctrine. MP Laakso also referred to a peer group, but by 
arguing that Sweden‟s decision to join the Ottawa Convention was easy because Finland was 
Sweden‟s landmine.96 From the statements of the Left Alliance it is apparent that the 
decisions of other countries play crucial role in the justifications. 
The party that most clearly and consistently argued for humanitarian grounds was the Green 
Party. In the Group statement the Greens refute that the whole issue is about the Eastern 
border, but that by universalizing the treaty it would have an impact on human life all around 
the world. According to the Greens, international community needs to systematically promote 
the treaty because landmines destroy human life in problem countries.
97
 MP Anni Sinnemäki 
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supported the group statement following similar justifications: the only way to support the 
treaty and to make it universal is to join it.
98
  
The parliamentary group of Christian Democratic Party only shortly referred to the funding 
issue, by stating that because there are no funds at the moment, Finland should join the 
Ottawa treaty in the long run, not in a hurry.
99
 
The parliamentary group of the main opposition party, Center Party, argued against the 
Ottawa Convention. In the group statement, CP viewed that there should be no stance towards 
Ottawa Treaty, because there are no plans how to replace the “central element of territorial 
defence”.100 None of the MPs from CP argued for the Ottawa Convention. MP Kari 
Myllyniemi went so far as to argue that landmines should never be abandoned and that even 
talking about it decreases the security of Finland.
101
 CP argued against the landmine ban by 
referring seven times to security arguments and three times to economic ones.  It is 
noteworthy that only Center Party argued directly against international pressures during the 
debate. Example MP Mirja Ryynänen stated that international pressures are over 
exaggerated.
102
 Also MP Markku Rossi stated that there is no reason to join and no country 
will downgrade Finland if it chooses not to participate to the treaty.
103
 MP Lauri Oinonen 
suggested that Finland should do “international PR” by concentrating on minesweeping in 
problem countries rather than abandoning mines altogether.
104
 
The only MP of the True Finns party referred both to economic and security arguments. 
According to MP Raimo Vistbacka, if landmines were abandoned it would require expensive 
border monitoring systems and because of the border is so long; it would require several 
milliards of Finnish Marks. MP Vistbacka also stated that no other EU country has such a 
border as Finland.
105
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Government Number of arguments by category 
Party Seats
106
 Group 
Position 
Against For 
Security Economic Constitutive Constraining 
SDP 51 For 6 2 1 4 
NCP 46 Against 5 8   
LA 20 For 1   2 
GP 11 For   3  
SPP 11 For 1 1 1  
CDP 10 Against  1   
Opposition Number of arguments by category 
Party Seats Group 
Position 
Against For 
Security Economic Constitutive Constraining 
CP 48 Against 7 3   
TF 1 Against 1 1   
 
Table 4: General debate 2001 argument frequency by party 
4.1.2. Defence Committee Memorandum and Voting 
After the debate the FSDP 2001 was sent to the Defence Committee to which the Foreign 
Affairs and Treasury Committees needed to make statements to. In the memorandum of the 
treasury to the Defence Committee it is stated that the current funding framework does not 
allow investments on replacement systems.
107
 The Foreign Affairs Committee‟s memorandum 
in turn holds important that Finland supports “efficient and global ban” for landmines and 
supports EU‟s actions to promote the Ottawa Treaty.108 The Defence Committee states that 
resolving the landmine question is important in respect to the defence capability and on the 
ability to deter wide scale attack. The Defence Committee suggests that the FDSP 2004 
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should make a stance on the issue of landmines.
109
 There were no dissenting opinions in the 
Defence Committee memorandum.  
The parliament voted on the FSDP 2001 on 19 December 2001. MP Raimo Vistbacka of the 
true Finns proposed that Parliament should denounce the abandoning of landmines until the 
Defence Forces gets sufficient funding to increase the defence ability.
110
 The motion was 
denied by 172 yes and 4 no votes. The no votes included two MPs from the SDP, one from 
TF and one from CP.
111
 
4.2. The Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004 
4.2.1 General Debate 2004 
The Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004 states that “Finland will accede to the Ottawa 
Convention, which prohibits anti-personnel landmines, in 2012 and destroy its landmines by 
2016.”112 The FSDP 2004 further continues that “Finland‟s credible defence capability will be 
maintained by acquiring systems to replace mines in the period 2009-2016. The necessary 
additional funding for this will be allocated to the defence appropriations framework.” 113 
There are two crucial differences to the FSDP 2001. First, the wording is now more definitive: 
“Finland will accede… [emphasis added]” and the previous wording ,“without compromising 
Finland‟s credible defence capability”114, that was used in the FSDP 2001, is no longer 
present. Second, the original accession and landmine demolition dates are postponed by six 
years from 2006 and 2010 to 2012 and 2016.  
The coalition government in 2004 consisted of three parties. The senior coalition partner is the 
Center Party, and the junior partners are the Social Democratic Party and the Swedish 
People‟s Party. The third big party, NCP, is now in the opposition among with the Christian 
Democrats, the Greens, the Left Alliance and the True Finns. Like in 2001, also in 2004 the 
issue of antipersonnel landmines invoked a heated discussion among the members of the 
parliament. The debate started with the opening statement of the Prime Minister Matti 
Vanhanen (CP). PM Vanhanen repeated the official government stance on landmines by 
referring to the dates of 2012 and 2016. PM Vanhanen continued that this policy was guided 
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to this direction by the previous FSDP from 2001, but now the published deadlines would be 
concrete.
115
  
The stance of the Center Party towards Ottawa treaty had changed from 2001. In the group 
statement MP Kauko Juhantalo acknowledged that landmines have been an integral part of the 
Finnish defence doctrine, but that “international responsibilities” require Finland to join the 
landmine ban. The Center Party further informs that the date for the ban is now postponed 
nearly ten years, but that even more could have been afforded.
116
 Almost all the remaining 
statements by the individual MPs of the CP argued that the policy of the CP is a consistent 
continuation of the past policy commitments. The CP further argued in the group statement, 
and through individual MPs, that this consistent policy was agreed also by the NCP in 2001. 
Example MP Antti Rantakangas argued that the past decision was not a weak promise, but a 
clear goal that was also supported by the NCP. MP Rantakangas emphasized that the decision 
which had been achieved now, and the postponing of the accession, was a “good 
compromise”.117 MP Rauno Kettunen however did no longer see the mine question as a 
question of a past decision as such, but argued that the decision is in line with the long 
standing humanitarian policy of Finland. This differs from other statements of the CP, which 
avoided the use of the term “humanitarian” and only referred to consistency of policy in 
general and commitments made in the past. Two MPs from the CP, however, were still openly 
skeptical about the decision. MP Pekka Viikuna claimed that Finland is trying to be more 
sacred than the Pope of Rome, and that Finnish mines are not endangering anybody.
118
 MP 
Lauri Oinonen made two statements. First MP Oinonen referred to the military utility of 
landmines and claimed that enemy attacking speed will triple, if landmines are abandoned.
119
 
In the second, he stated to understand the humanitarian ideas that are woken up when one sees 
grotesque amputated limbs, but continued that the Finnish mines are locked away and do not 
pose such a harm. In addition, MP Oinonen stated that the money could be spent somewhere 
else than on expensive replacing systems.
120
 The CP justified the mine ban decision with 
constraining consistency arguments seven times during the debate and only once used directly 
humanitarian argument. Security arguments against the treaty were used twice and economic 
ones once.  
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The group statement of the SDP also emphasized the consistency of policy in their group 
statement by arguing that Finland has been an advocate of the mine ban in international 
forums during the past years and it would be contradictory now to act otherwise.
121
 MP Arto 
Seppälä in turn referred the mine ban being important in respect to the “official image” of 
Finland.
122
 Like CP, also the SDP attacked against the NCPs view of the mine ban, which 
they claimed not to be consistent with their past behavior.
123
 Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja 
stated that Finland was lucky because the consistency of Finnish policy was no longer in the 
hands of the NCP.
124
 Only one MP, MP Tero Rönni, from the SDP argued against the chosen 
policy path by invoking an economic argument. MP Rönni did not agree with the decision 
because it would increase the defence budget.
125
 It is noteworthy to see that like CP, also SDP 
avoided using humanitarian arguments directly to justify the Ottawa Convention.  
During the parliamentary debate the coalition partner Swedish People‟s Party did not raise up 
the question of the Ottawa Convention. 
In their group statement, the NCP argued that the earliest date to join the Ottawa Convention 
should be in 2020, after when the ignition mechanisms of the landmines have been outdated. 
In NCPs view the main argument for joining, the reputation of Finland, is not a sufficient 
reason to spend 300 million Euros on replacing systems. NCP also continues that the 
reputation argument is not verified.
126
 The group statement no longer invoked the issue of 
military utility of landmines, but concentrated on the issue of costs. Individual MPs however 
still continued to argue for the military utility perspective. MP Ben Zyskowicz stated not to 
understand, that if one balances between national security and reputation, the reputation 
wins.
127
 Similarly MP Marjukka Karttunen questioned how Finland‟s reputation would suffer 
if Ottawa Convention was not signed and argued that better reputation would be acquired by 
keeping landmines, because then Finland would have a reputation as a country that has a 
credible defence.
128
 MP Jere Lahti in turn pointed out that the FSDP still lists a wide scale 
attack as a possibility, and as long as it is a possibility, landmines are not obsolete.
129
 MP 
Reijo Paananen went as far as to argue that landmines are the world‟s most effective weapon 
                                                          
121
 Ibid, 11. 
122
 Ibid, 93. 
123
 Ibid, 35. 
124
 Ibid, 40.  
125
 Ibid, 87. 
126
 Ibid, 15 - 16.  
127
 Ibid, 36. 
128
 PTK 98/2004, 40. 
129
 PTK 97/2004, 60. 
29 
 
to deter an enemy attack.
130
 Only MP Olli Nepponen was somewhat inclined to support the 
mine ban decision by arguing that even if there is no agreement yet what the replacing 
systems would be, Finland had committed itself not to produce more landmines in 1997, and 
thus the current decision is consistent with the past policy.
131
 In sum, the largest opposition 
party NCP argued against the Ottawa Convention by using security arguments 12 times and 
economic arguments seven times. Many MPs directly attacked against the argument of 
reputation presented by MPs from other parties. Only one MP, MP Olli Nepponen, argued for 
the treaty by twice using constraining arguments.  
Opposition party Christian Democrats were against the Ottawa. In their group statement, 
Christian Democrats viewed that the decision of not be part of the Ottawa had not stirred 
international criticism. Also the issue of mines being outdated soon was not an issue, because 
the ignitions could be easily replaced, according to CD. CD viewed that a small criticism from 
abroad is not a sufficient reason to spend hundreds of millions of Euros.
132
 In a similar way, 
MP Leena Rauhala emphasized costs, by saying that dates are not as important as costs and 
that the millions could be used otherwise.
133
 MP Sari Essayah argued for a security 
perspective by stating that landmines are defensive weapons that cannot be used for an attack 
and that mines suit the defence doctrine of Finland.
134
 
The Green Party introduced a new kind of argument by directly attacking against the 
traditional territorial defence doctrine by reframing the concept of security. The Greens did 
not see state no longer as the key source of agency. In their only statement about mines, MP 
Tarja Cronberg in the group statement of the Green Party argued that Finland is not facing 
such an infantry threat from Russia that could be defended against or slowed down with 
mines. The statement continued that new security threats such as terrorism and infectious 
diseases disregard mines completely. Because of this, the Ottawa Treaty could be very well 
signed already in 2006 as was the original plan.
135
 The argumentation has changed from 2001, 
when the Greens emphasized humanitarian issues.  
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The True Finns argued that also USA and Russia should be in the treaty if landmines will be 
destroyed and Finland should not spent hundreds of millions if there are landmines in use at 
the other side of the border.
136
 
Government Number of arguments by category 
Party Seats
137
 Group 
Position 
Against For 
Security Economic Constitutive Constraining 
CP 55 For 2 1 1 7 
SDP 53 For  1  6 
SPP 8 -     
Opposition Number of arguments by category 
Party Seats Group 
Position 
Against For 
Security Economic Constitutive Constraining 
NCP 40 Against 6 4  1 
LA 19 For   4 2 
GP 14 Against     
CDP 7 For 1 2   
TF 3 Against 1 1   
Other 1 -     
 
Table 5: General debate 2004 argument frequency by party 
The Left Alliance was the party that most emphasized humanitarian issues during the 2004 
debate. In their group statement MP Suvi-Anne Siimes criticized the debate on landmines to 
be nationalistic and defence oriented, and that the humanitarian objectives of the treaty had 
been lost.
138
 MP Erkki Viitanen rebutted against all of those who argued that Finnish mines 
are not dangerous by asking why mines are prohibited if they were not dangerous.
139
 MP 
Pentti Tiusanen‟s argument is a clear example of what Ruthenford called priming during the 
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cognitive agenda setting phase, by telling a story of his visit to the Orthopedic Hospital near 
Kabul where children and mothers were treated for their loss of upper and lower body parts. 
MP Tiusanen also presented a constraining argument that it is not possible that “N countries” 
minus Finland will join the treaty.
140
 Also MP Outi Ojala argued that those countries that are 
outside, are giving justification for other countries to do the same.
141
 By arguing in this vein, 
MP Ojala makes counter arguers to choose which group they want to belong to, invoking the 
issue of identity.  
4.2.2 Defence Committee Memorandum 
At the end of the general debate MP Pulliainen (GP) made a proposal against the original 
motion of sending the FSDP to the Defence Committee and proposed that it should be sent to 
the Foreign Affairs Committee instead. The motion was denied 95-70, with one abstention. 
Allocation of votes can be seen in Table six. The Original motion (sending to Defence 
Committee) is “Yes” and the motion by MP Pulliainen is “No”. 
 
 Yes No Abstained Away 
Center Party 41 4 0 10 
SDP 7 36 1 8 
NCP 33 2 0 6 
Left Alliance 7 10 0 2 
Green Party 0 10 0 4 
Christian 
Democratic 
Party 
4 1 0 1 
True Finns  3 0 0 0 
 
Table 6: Committee Selection Voting
142
 
In the Defence Committee memorandum it is stated that the Committee had differing 
suggestions from the Defence Ministry (DM) and from the Foreign Affairs Ministry 
(FAM).
143
 The end report of the separate Landmine Committee which was published in July 
2004 did not give definitive answer when to join the Ottawa Convention but gave two sets of 
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dates. The representatives from the DM suggested that Finland should join in 2012.
144
 The 
FAM in turn suggested an earlier date of 2008. The representatives of FAM justified the 
earlier accession date with the credibility of Finland‟s foreign policy.145 The Defence 
Committee states that important aspect in the current decision is the decision made in the 
European Union in 1997, where Finland among the other EU states declared to stop 
production or sales of landmines.
146
 This decision, according to the Committee, prevents 
Finland to renew its stockpile of antipersonnel landmines even outside the Ottawa Treaty. The 
committee continues that the landmines would outdate in the beginning of the 2020s
147
. The 
Defence Committee memorandum ends to a conclusion that it supports the dates of 2012-
2016 proposed by the FSDP 2004.
148
 
Several MPs however left differing opinions to the memorandum. Tony Halme of the True 
Finns argued that appropriate joining date should be the year 2020, when the landmines 
outdate.
149
 Bjarne Kallis of the Christian Democrats proposed that the ignition plugs of the 
landmines should be replaced so that the usage of them could be prolonged. According to MP 
Kallis, landmines will not outdate if this is done and reputational pressures towards Finland 
do not exist.
150
 Seppo Lahtela of the Center Party proposed that landmines should be used as 
long as neighboring countries have landmines.
151
 
The differing opinions were voted against in December 2004. In addition two other motions 
were presented to the parliament. MP Eero Akaan-Penttilä (NCP) with the support of Jyri 
Häkämies (NCP) proposed that the parliament should not support the government‟s decision 
to abandon working anti-personnel landmines.
152
 MP Ulla Anttila (GP) with a support of MP 
Suvi-Anne Siimes (LA) proposed that the parliament should demand the government to sign 
the Ottawa Treaty by the end of March 2007.
153
 None of these motions passed.  
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4.3. The Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2009 
The FSDP 2009 states that “Finland has pledged to join the Ottawa Mine Ban Convention in 
2012 and to destroy its anti-personnel mine stockpiles by the end of 2016.”154 The FSDP 2009 
also states that “The Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel mines has been widely 
implemented. Mine clearance, humanitarian mine action, disposal of explosive remnant of 
war as well as destruction of stockpiles, as laid down in the Convention, remain topical 
challenges.”155  
The coalition government in 2009 consisted of the Center Party as a senior coalition partner 
and the National Coalition Party, the Green Party and the Swedish People‟s Party as junior 
partners.  
The debate on Ottawa Treaty in 2009 is considerably tamer than during the previous FSDP 
discussions. This can be explained by the fact that the wording of the 2004 decision was 
definitive in nature. Now, those actors who previously advocated the ban on landmines often 
brought up the issue of cluster munitions. For example the group statement of the Greens
156
 
and Left Alliance
157
 both emphasized Finland‟s role in international disarmament and referred 
to cluster munitions. Also MP Kimmo Kiljunen (SDP), a vocal advocate of the mine ban, 
argued for the cluster munitions ban.
158
  
The True Finns, with the voice of MP Timo Soini, however brought up the issue of mines, 
and argued that the past decision was wrong since the country is facing increased budgetary 
constraints.
159
  
MP Päivi Lipponen (SDP) argued in connection to the debate about defence budget that at the 
same time one cannot support cutting off defence budget, ban on landmines and credible 
defence. MP Lipponen stated that one of the defence strategies of Finland has been to build a 
mine field at the border if an aggression occurs. Now, accrording to her, when Finland has 
joined international agreement to ban landmines, the weapons must be replaced with more 
expensive weapons, otherwise the defence is not sustainable.
160
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In 2009 the FSDP was sent to the Foreign Affairs Committee, to which the Treasury 
Committee, the Administration Committee and the Defence Committee give statements to. 
The 2009 memorandum of the Defence Committee emphasizes the United Nations framework 
as disarmament and arms monitoring forum.
161
 It however acknowledges that some 
significant arms negotiations have occurred outside the UN framework, such as the Ottawa 
Treaty on antipersonnel landmines and Oslo Treaty on cluster munitions. Defence Committee 
continues that in the future, processes, such as Oslo and Ottawa, can occur and Finland should 
be involved in these. The Defence Committee however states that disarmament processes 
outside the UN framework need to be evaluated not only from humanitarian angles, but also 
the national defence and geographical coverage need to be taken into account.
162
  
4.4. Decision and Accession 2011 - 2012 
The coalition government of 2011, like in 2003, is also a so called rainbow coalition 
collecting wide range of parties from left to right. The senior coalition partner is now the 
NCP, and juniors are SDP, LA, SPP, GP and CDP. There are now two large groups in the 
opposition, the Center Party, and the True Finns.  
The new government was formed in the spring 2011. The first handling government proposal 
HE 15/2011 on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on their Destruction is held in the parliament in 27
th
 of 
September 2011 at the first session of the fall season. The process goes on as the following. In 
the first session, a general debate is held and the proposal is sent to a committee. In this case, 
because the Ottawa Convention is an international treaty, the proposal is sent to the Foreign 
Affairs Committee to which the Law Committee and Administration Committee give 
statements to. In the second session the Foreign Affairs Committee memorandum is handled 
and the technical and legal form is approved. The parliament votes in the third session. This 
part first goes through the HE 15/2011, then the general debate, the justification of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee, and finally the voting results. The voting results are summarized 
in the Table eight.  
4.4.1 Government Proposal HE 15/2011 
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The government proposal 15/2011 is a sixty page document. Half of the document is technical 
in nature and goes through the changes needed in national legislation and public 
administration to implement the conditions required by the Ottawa treaty. The other half 
justifies the joining decision and describes the economic and defence consequences of 
accession. For the purposes of this study, it is necessary to go through the justifications given 
in the proposal.  
The HE 15/2011 states that according to international law, in a conflict situation, states cannot 
use certain weapons or means. The proposal lists principles which limit the conduct of war: 
discrimination principle which prohibits attacking civilian target, discrimination principle that 
prohibits the use of such force that cannot reliably fulfill the first principle, proportionality 
principle according to which prohibits such force in which the consequences to civilians 
would not outweigh the military utility, early warning principle which requires the warring 
parties to warn civilian population even before the outbreak of conflict so that civilian 
casualties can be minimized and finally, a principle that prohibits the use of such weapons 
that cause unnecessary harm or suffering.
163
 
Based on the previous principles, the proposal continues that antipersonnel landmines cause 
significant humanitarian and economic harm across the world because they cannot separate 
civilians from combatants and can be active decades after the conflict is over.
164
 The proposal 
gives credit to the efforts of the international civil society and particularly the International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines in promoting the ban on antipersonnel landmines. The proposal 
also points out the fact that so far 156 countries have joined the treaty (as of 27 September 
2011).
 165
 
4.4.2. General Debate 
The general debate of 2011 is as fierce as it was during 2001 and 2004. There are no group 
statements and individual MPs present their views and ask questions from the Ministers. 
There are some crucial differences to earlier debates. First one is that the True Finns have now 
increased their seats from earlier 11 to 39. This clearly shows in the number of arguments. 
The second is that the NCP, which is now the senior coalition partner holding the position of 
Prime Minister, is showing constraint. The third is that the Center Party, which is now in the 
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opposition, has started to argue against their 2004 stance and follow more the behavior 
present in 2001. The argument frequencies in the general debate are summarized in the table 
seven.  
The majority of NCPs statements about landmines are security oriented. MP Jukka Korpa 
example argues that the decision will lower the threshold of military intervention.
166
 MP 
Janne Sankelo in turn refers to a study made by the Defence Forces which claim that enemy 
attacking speed will considerably increase if landmines are abandoned.
167
 MP Heikki Autto in 
turn refer to the casualty rates of landmine victims being decreased considerably, from 25 000 
in the 1990s to 4000 in 2009, even when Finland has been outside the treaty and joining 
would seriously harm Finnish defence.
168
 MP Kimmo Sasi in turn argues that foreign and 
security policy need to be consistent but since the economic situation has worsened, Finland 
should consider postponing the accession.
169
 MP Ben Zyskowicz however argues that the 
decision has already been made twice and it is too late to change it now. MP Zyscowicz 
points the blame on CP which according to him made a bad decision in 2004.
170
 MP 
Zyscowicz makes the same argument later on and states that Finland cannot make a complete 
u-turn since the decision has been made twice in 2004 and 2009.
171
 
The SDP makes a constraining consistency argument twice during the general debate. MP 
Jouni Backmann thinks it is strange that old coalition partners are now seemingly reversing 
their decision made in 2004 and 2009.
172
 In similar vein MP Johannes Koskinen argues that 
the decision has been made twice with a wide consensus.
173
 
The Left Alliance does not argue only that past decisions constrain, but refer continuously to 
humanitarian arguments, and also point out to the number of other countries that have signed 
the treaty both in Europe and in the other parts of the world. MP Annika Lapintie starts by 
stating that it should be remembered that the landmine decision is a humanitarian issue and 
still 4000 people yearly are victims of landmines. In addition, MP Lapintie points that 156 
countries have so far signed the treaty.
174
 Later on MP Lapintie reminds the parliament that 
only 40 countries are outside the treaty, Finland is the only EU country left outside and from 
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the states in Europe, only Russia in addition to Finland has not acceded.
175
 Also MP Erkki 
Virtanen argues that the landmine ban was made because of humanitarian reasons.
176
 MP Kari 
Uotila in turn argues that security is not reached with equipment at the border but with 
pragmatic and consistent foreign policy.
177
 In one statement of MP Lapintie uses priming by 
stating that landmines kill children who are fetching water.
178
 
Government Number of arguments by category 
Party Seats
179
 Group 
Position 
Against For 
Security Economic Constitutive Constraining 
NCP 44 N/A 4 1  2 
SDP 42 N/A    2 
LA 14 N/A   4 4 
GP 10 N/A   2 4 
SPP 9 N/A    2 
CDP 6 N/A     
Opposition  Number of arguments by category 
Party Seats Group 
Position 
Against For 
Security Economic Constitutive Constraining 
CP 35 N/A 3 4   
TF 39 N/A 9 9   
 
Table 7: General debate 2011 argument frequency by party 
The Green Party argued mainly through constraining lines but also referred to humanitarian 
arguments. MP Pekka Haavisto argued that the Ottawa Treaty had decreased the market share 
of landmines and because infected regions are usually poor, the actors do not have money to 
spend on replacing systems. Thus genuine disarmament occurs, and a weapon category that is 
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harmful to women and children is taken out of circulation.
180
 Later on MP Haavisto told that 
not only the landmine ban has a positive impact on conflict zones, but also that joining the 
treaty could have positive impact when Finland seeks a UN Security Council seat and the 
accession would have huge impact on Finland´s reputation. MP in turn Anni Sinnemäki 
supported the notion that MP Zyskowicz made earlier by arguing that Finland needs to be 
consistent if it wants to maintain the image of reliable international contracting partner. MP 
Sinnemäki further stated that Finland is finally taking its place among “civilized nations” by 
expressing support to mine victims.
181
 
The Defence Minister Stefan Wallin (SPP) argued that the issue is about reputation of 
Finland. According to DM Wallin, Finland has made the decision twice in 2004 and 2009 
(note that 2001 is not counted in) and is the last EU country that has not ratified the treaty, 
with the exception of Poland. DM Wallin also points out that 156 countries so far have joined 
the treaty.
182
 In another statement DM Wallin argues that the issue is really about how Finland 
represents itself as a credible international contracting partner.
183
 
The opposition party True Finns presented themselves as an opponent of the treaty. Especially 
the True Finns saw the issue fully as a security matter. The MPs Ritva Elomaa
184
 and Jussi 
Niinistö
185
 both cited studies made by the defence forces or defence experts. MPs Pertti 
Virtanen
186
, Olli Immonen
187
 and Jussi Halla-Aho
188
 referred to the geographical position of 
Finland and the fact that Finland has a long border with Russia. The True Finns denounced 
that the fact that landmines are a problem in other countries should affect the policy of 
Finland. MP Lauri Oinonen for example argued that every country must think of themselves 
first.
189
 MP Mika Niikko in turn directly argued that Finland should not show “solidarity” 
towards other countries.
190
 In addition the true Finns brought up the issue of costs by nine 
times arguing that landmines are cost efficient and cheap weapons.  
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The Center Party argumentation differs dramatically from that of 2004 when the party was in 
the government with the SDP. The CP argues now with security and economic arguments 
against the Ottawa Treaty. Similarly as the True Finns, MP Eero Reijonen refers to expert 
studies which emphasize the military utility value of landmines.
191
 MP Mikko Savola in turn 
argues that it is Finland‟s interest to stay out of Ottawa because landmines are cheap and 
efficient.
192
 The global economic crisis also shows in the rhetoric of CP. Example MP Antti 
Rantakangas argues that the economic situation is very different from 2004 and 2009 and that 
Finland should thus reconsider the timeframe of joining.
193
 Also MP Timo V. Korhonen 
argues that since the military already faces spending cuts replacement systems will not 
guarantee credible defence to the whole country.
194
 
4.4.3. Foreign Affairs Committee Memorandum 
After the general debate the government proposal is sent to the Foreign Affairs Committee to 
which the Law Committee and administration committees give statements to. The Foreign 
Affairs Committee gave its memorandum on 15
th
 of November 2011. The committee heard 
representatives from the government, military and NGOs.  NGOs present were Finnish Red 
Cross, Finnish Peace Union and Church‟s Foreign Aid organization.195 
The Foreign Affairs Committee supported the government proposal 15/2011 with one 
dissenting opinion from the True Finns. At its justification the memorandum states that 
protection of civilian population during a war is one of the central elements of international 
rules and despite international efforts, such as the Geneva Process, antipersonnel landmines 
have continued to inflict suffering on civilian population across the world, especially in the 
developing countries.
196
 The memorandum gives credit to international society which took the 
AP landmine issue on its agenda with the strong support from NGO sector.
197
 According to 
the memorandum, the goal of the Ottawa process was humanitarian.
198
 
The memorandum continues that the original plan of Finland was to join the Ottawa Treaty in 
2006, but the FSDP 2004 postponed the decision to 2012. The accession commitment was 
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restated in FSDP 2009.
199
 The justification for postponing is, according to the memorandum, 
to assure the acquisition of replacement systems and their funding.
200
 The memorandum 
acknowledges that the current financial crisis has added pressures to once again postpone the 
accession, but however, the accession can be agreed based on previous commitments made in 
2004 and 2009.
201
 The policy is, according to the memorandum, consistent policy of Finland 
to reinforce international norms, even when Finland has not been part of the problem.
202
 
The official statement part of the Foreign affairs Committee that the parliament votes on can 
be translated the following: Finland has been active in development and implementation of 
international humanitarian law. Finland takes part in all central treaties of humanitarian law. 
The Committee holds it to be consistent that Finland will join the Ottawa treaty based on the 
previous policy commitments agreed upon in the Parliament.
203
 
The True Finns left a dissenting opinion and proposed that the parliament discard the 
government proposal HE 15/2011. The True Finn members of the Foreign Affairs Committee 
argue that nothing can replace the added value that antipersonnel landmines give to the 
Finnish defence.
204
 According to the dissenting opinion, every state has a right to defend its 
territorial integrity and AP-landmines are suitable for this task. True Finns could agree to 
abandon landmines if other countries would, especially Russia, show reciprocity and abandon 
their stockpiles of landmines.
205
 True Finns also argue that there are no basis for wide ranging 
mine ban since the ban has not been made in UN framework nor have consent from the 
Security Council. In addition the 38 countries outside the treaty represent half of the world‟s 
population.
206
 
4.4.4. The Final Vote 
The final voting results are summarized in the table below. There is not a single “no” vote 
among the government parties. The coalition holds. However there are many MPs in the 
government parties that are absent from the voting. The opposition party True Finns voted 
against the treaty and only three MPs were absent. The voting behavior of opposition party 
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CP is split in half with 17 supporting, 11 against and seven away. None of the MPs voted 
empty.  
Party Gov./Opp. Yes No Absent Empty 
NCP Gov. 31 0 13 0 
SDP Gov. 31 0 10 0 
GP Gov. 9 0 1 0 
True Finns Opp. 0 36 3 0 
CP Opp. 17 11 7 0 
CDP Gov. 6 0 0 0 
LA Gov. 9 0 3 0 
SPP Gov. 6 0 4 0 
Table 8: Voting results
207
 
4.5. Discussion of Results 
The research question of this study is why Finland joined the Ottawa Convention? The norm 
theory posits that there are two main mechanisms through which norm adoption, or 
socialization, to new norms happen. Constitutive works through moral persuasion and social 
learning. When an actor faces new information it can change how the issue is perceived. In 
the case of landmines the international civil society was able to reframe the landmine issue 
from pure security and military matter to a humanitarian problem. From the official 
justification that are present in the FSDPs, Committee Memorandums and the final 
Government Proposal, one could draw a conclusion that after 12 years since the Ottawa 
Treaty came into force, Finland was morally persuaded and finally internalized the norm 
against landmines. This view is however contradicted by the justifications given and debate 
conducted at the parliament between 2001 and 2011.  
The way in which different actors perceive the issue throughout the ten year span does not 
change in a meaningful way. Actors who in 2001 argued for security angles do not start to 
justify the accession with humanitarian arguments. This goes also the other way around, even 
when some actors consistently argue for security perspective it does not change the perception 
of those actors who are positively inclined towards the accession. For example although 
SDP‟s group position was positive towards the Ottawa treaty already in 2001, many 
individual MPs argued against it by using security arguments. During the ten year period, 
SDP showed a more unified front and internal opposition decreased. The justifications, 
however, were primarily constraining. It is noteworthy to mention, that some of the antipathy 
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towards Ottawa among MPs of the SDP was stemming from the perception that the 
alternative to landmines would be a techno army. This is evident from statement that referred 
to the military industrial lobby. 
Also CP and NCP favored constraining arguments when their group positions changed to 
positive. The indicator four presented in the methodology section – party position towards the 
Ottawa treaty changing from negative to positive followed by a change in rhetoric 
emphasizing reputational/consistency issues – was present both in the case of CP in 2004 and 
NCP in 2011. In 2001 the CP used security arguments seven times and economic arguments 
three, but in 2004 security arguments dropped to three and economic to one, while 
constraining arguments increased to eight. The pessimistic stance of the CP however reflected 
in the time frame of the accession. The original accession date of 2006 was postponed till 
2012. Also in the final vote of 2011 the CP was divided: 17 voted yes and 11 no. This can be 
explained by the fact that in 2011 CP was an opposition party and thus experiencing less 
constraint. The behavior also supports the idea that the right side of the political spectrum had 
only instrumentally adopted the mine stance. The process of the NCPs mine stance follows 
similar lines. NCP used security and economic arguments throughout the process, but finally 
yielded and the rhetoric started to emphasize constraining justifications.  
What is surprising is that although humanitarian arguments are slightly more present towards 
the end of the process, this increase is not dramatic. Those actors who are inclined towards the 
accession rather argue trough constraining lines by referring to the number of other countries 
that have joined or that Finland is an outlier among a peer group. Especially references to the 
aggregate number of states inside the Ottawa Treaty, is often present in the debate. Table nine 
shows the total number of arguments used and also aggregate number of justifications by 
party. Constraining justifications were used 41 times during the debate and constitutive only 
17 times. Only the Left Alliance and the Green Party relied heavily on constitutive 
justifications. NCP relied most heavily on security arguments, referring to the matter 21 
times. The second is Center Party with 12 and third the True Finns with 11 justifications. The 
NCP and the CP which both yielded in favor of the Ottawa Convention use primarily 
constraining justifications for the accession. Economic justifications were most popular 
among the NCP. 
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 Security Economic Constitutive Constraining 
SDP 6 2 1 13 
CP 12 8 1 9 
NCP 21 17 0 4 
LA 1 0 8 8 
CDP 1 3 0 0 
GP 0 0 6 5 
SPP 1 1 1 2 
TF 11 8  0 0 
Total 53 39 17 41 
 
Table 9: Argument frequency 2001 – 2011 
During the debates actors consistently referred to studies that supported their own perception 
of the issue. Actors who represented the right side of the political spectrum tended to refer to 
studies made by the military or defence forces and emphasize the military utility of 
antipersonnel landmines. Similarly the left side of the political spectrum referred to studies 
made by peace organizations and NGOs which supported their perception. Even same 
numbers provided by the same organization could be used either to support or oppose the 
Ottawa treaty. For example MP Heikki Autto (NCP) referred to the death toll of 4000 in 2010 
being small compared to the early 1990s and MP Annika Lapintie (LA) used the same number 
to demonstrate that landmines still cause human suffering. This kind of behavior, where actor 
uses arguments that support their own world view, is supporting the constructivist logic. 
Rational models assume that actors, whether government or individual political leaders, act 
rationally and perceive the world systematically arriving into decisions through “an open 
intellectual process: goals are ordered, a search is made for relevant information, a wide range 
of alternatives is considered, and the option that maximizes the benefits while minimizing 
costs is selected”.208 Different actors had different cognitive frames or belief systems that can 
be treated as lenses through which the actor views the world. For the right side of the political 
spectrum, the lens through which AP-landmines were viewed is security. On the other hand, 
actors whose world view was originally inclined towards disarmament and solidarity quickly 
internalized the humanitarian logic. Generally the latter group consisted of the left wing 
parties. These findings refute the “rational actor” model and support findings made in the field 
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of political psychology. Objective reality is filtered through subjective belief system which 
strives to consistency.
209
 In a seminal piece, Robert Jervis writes: “It is often impossible to 
explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision makers‟ belief about 
the world and their images of others”.210 This also means that, in the case of Finland, the norm 
against landmines has not reached the last phase of the norm life cycle, internalization.  
When it comes to the hypotheses presented in section 3.5, it can be concluded that both 
mechanisms played a role. However, when looking at the frequency of justification used, the 
constitutive arguments were not present as often as constraining. Moral persuasion during the 
ten year span analyzed has also less support, since the indicator two presented in the Table 
four of the methodology is not present: no party which was originally opposing the treaty 
started in any given point justify the accession on humanitarian grounds, this applies both to 
CP in 2004 and NCP in 2011.
211
 Only exception is one statement in 2004 by Rauno Kettunen 
(CP) who argued that the decision is in line with Finland‟s long standing humanitarian 
policy.
212
 Even this can be interpreted to be somewhat constraining, because it refers to earlier 
policy commitments. However, the statement is allocated to the constitutive category because 
MP Kettunen has accepted the issue being framed as humanitarian. To answer the research 
question however, why Finland joined the Ottawa treaty, in the light of the results, hypotheses 
H3b - constraining primary, constitutive secondary - has the strongest empirical support. This 
option was hypothesized to have support if both constitutive and constraining justification 
were present in the debates, but there was more indication towards constraining. It can be said 
however that both mechanisms are necessary but alone not sufficient reason for joining. 
Without the left wing parties being morally persuaded already in the beginning phases of the 
process, the decision would never have been arrived to the parliament. For example Jeffrey 
Checkel calls elites “„gatekeepers‟ who ultimately control the political agenda”.213 However, 
it is as much unlikely that the parties on the right, who are maintaining a very realist picture of 
world politics and advocate a strong national defence, would have ever yielded towards the 
accession without international pressures stemming from the fact that majority of states in the 
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world had acceded to the treaty and that Finland was an outlier in the EU and in the world. 
Even when Finland faced strong economic constraints after the financial crisis, Finland‟s 
identity as a reliable international contracting partner prevented it from reversing the past 
decisions, a justification present in the rhetoric of the NCP during 2011 debate. Also, the fact 
that the left wing parties did not use humanitarian arguments as often, even when it is the 
official justification found from the FSDP‟s, but relied on referring to other states, supports 
that the left wing parties perceived this argument to be more effective in persuading the 
conservatives than moral persuasion based on humanitarian arguments. Although landmine 
victim stories, so called “priming”, did happen, this was consistently rebutted by the counter 
arguers by statements such as Finland was not par taking in the problem since Finnish 
antipersonnel landmines are in warehouses.  In many points, by referring to other states, the 
left wing parties invoked a question of identity by making the opponent choose to which 
group Finland belongs. Even among the group of the True Finns it was acknowledged that it 
is an exception that a “civilized nation” such as Finland is outside the treaty.  
These empirical findings are also consistent with the predictions of the norm life cycle, which 
posits that after the norm cascade has been reached, the dominant mechanism is no longer 
moral persuasion, but peer pressure which works trough legitimacy, esteem and conformity. 
Legitimacy of a state comes from other states. This is why the number of other states was 
frequently referred to. Esteem referred to image, of what other states think of Finland. 
Because of this many actors were concerned about the impact of being out of Ottawa Treaty 
to Finland‟s image. Conformity referred to the need of states being part of a certain group. 
This explains statements which argued that “civilized nations” should not use indiscriminate 
weapons, but also references to smaller peer groups such as the European Union which was 
present in the official justifications. 
Conclusion 
This study was a case study of Finland‟s recent decision to join the Ottawa Treaty banning 
antipersonnel landmines and asked a research question of why Finland joined the Ottawa 
Convention? The research used process tracing as a method to analyze justifications for the 
accession. The theoretical approach of this study can be labeled as sociological 
institutionalism. Institutions work as an intervening variable between actor preferences and 
policy outcomes. These preferences however are not exogenously given but stem from within 
– endogenously – and are shaped by interaction. This study looked at two mechanisms how 
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preferences can be reshaped: by constitutive and constraining mechanisms. Before the actual 
case study, this study reviewed the evolution of the norm against landmines. Unlike during 
the Geneva negotiations, in the Ottawa process, the international civil society was in a key 
position to promote and keep the issue on the international political agenda, by framing 
landmines from a military and security issue to a humanitarian problem. This was possible 
because of the political opportunity structure provided by the international humanitarian law, 
and especially the long standing principles of jus in bello, which requires civilian populations 
to be protected during a conflict and that gains of a military action needs to be proportional 
and not cause unnecessary harm or suffering. Majority of landmine studies, such as the work 
of Price and Rutheford cited in this study, concentrate on the international level of analysis. 
This study complements these studies, but also norms literature in general, by looking at the 
domestic level. 
By analyzing the debates conducted at the Finnish Parliament between the years 2001 and 
2011 this study found empirical evidence that from the hypothesized constitutive and 
constraining mechanisms, both played a role in the Finland‟s decision. Without the left wing 
parties being receptive to the moral persuasion and re-framing of the landmine issue already 
in the beginning phases of the process, it is unlikely that the right wing parties would have 
had enough political will to push the change forward. On the other hand, the constraints posed 
by the identity of Finland as a developed western “civilized state”, member of the European 
Union and a credible international contracting partner prevented it to reverse the political 
decision even after facing increased economic constraint after the financial crisis. 
The findings support the notion that the constraining mechanism is more important than moral 
persuasion after the norm cascade has been reached. For Finland, it was no longer appropriate 
behavior to use landmines as a mean to defend the country, not only because of their 
indiscriminate nature and humanitarian reasons, but also because of peer pressure stemming 
from shared identity. Future studies could compare discussions in other cases before and after 
the norm cascade has been reached to further find empirical support for this finding. The other 
interesting finding was the clear cut division between the left and the right. Future studies 
could device an analysis that would use left-right divide as a predictor for landmine stance, 
but also for other kind of disarmament. Not only could one look at whether left promote more 
disarmament than the right but also which of the two mechanisms works better at socializing 
to emerging norms. Are for example the left wing parties more receptive to moral persuasion 
and right wing parties to peer pressure? A noteworthy finding is also the lack of successful 
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moral persuasion. Individual MPs, but also the group statements of the parties, tended to cite 
information that supported their own belief systems. This supports the findings made in the 
field of political psychology: individuals strive to cognitive consistency by filtering out 
information that work against their belief system and emphasize supporting evidence. Future 
study could go even further and move from the domestic level of analysis to individual level 
and investigate in which circumstances and through what mechanisms individuals are 
receptive to information that works against their belief systems. These questions however 
were out of the scope of this study.  
Was the issue “right” decision is in the hands of the perceiver and depends on how actor 
defines interests. If the issue is perceived solely from a military-security vantage point it was 
the “wrong” decision. Landmine ban does decrease the defence capability against a traditional 
wide scale military invasion. If one however has a more cosmopolitan worldview and 
emphasizes humanitarian aspects, and incorporates a moral calculus into the decision making, 
the landmine decision was the “right” decision. Landmines are indiscriminate weapons which 
cause wide scale human suffering. These two perceptions were the main divide among the 
Finnish parliament. Only time will tell whether there will ever be a strong internalized 
international norm against landmines similar to chemical and biological weapons.  
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Appendix 
All data is translated by the researcher from the original Finnish language to English with 
respect to the original meaning. All sources, for example “PTK 87/2001”, use the same 
abbreviation that is present at the online archive of the Finnish Parliament. If one wants to 
extract the original Finnish text it can be done by entering the abbreviation, for example “PTK 
87/2001”, to the search engine at http://www.eduskunta.fi.  
Argument Frequency Data 2001 
Government 
Party Against For 
 Security Economic Constitutive Constraining 
SDP 1 1 22 33 44 55 66 17 28  19 110  211 312 413 
LA 114   115  216 
NCP 117 218 319 420 
521  
122 223 324 425 526 627 
728 829 
  
GP   130  231  332  
SPP 133 134 135  
CDP  136   
 
Opposition 
Party Against For 
 Security Economic Constitutive Constraining 
CP 137 238 339 440 541 
642 743 
144 245 346   
TF 147 148   
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Argument Frequency Data 2004 
Government 
Party Against For 
 Security Economic Constitutive Constraining 
CP 149 250 151 152 153 254 355 
456 557 658 
759 860 
SDP  161  162 263 364 
465 566 667 
768 
SPP     
 
Opposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Party Against For 
 Security Economic Constitutive Constraining 
NCP 169 270 371 472 573 
674 775 876 977 1078 
1179 1280 
181 282 383 484 585 686 
787 
 188 289 
CDP 190 191 292   
GP    193 
TF 194 195   
LA   196 297 398 
499 
1100 2101 
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Argument Frequency Data 2011 
Government 
Party Against For 
Security Economic Constitutive Constraining 
NCP 1102 2103 3104 4105 1106 2107  1108 2109 
SDP    1110 2111 
LA   1112 2113 3114 4115 1116 2117 3118 4119 
GP   1120 2121 1122 2123 3124 4125 
SPP    1126 2127 
CDP     
  
Opposition  
Party Against For 
Security Economic Constitutive Constraining 
CP 1128 2129 3130 1131 2132 3133 4134  1135 
TF 1136 2137 3138 4139 
5140 6141 7142 8143 
9144 
1145 2146 3147 4148 
5149 6150 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
                                                          
1
 PTK 87/2001, 30: Jukka Gustafsson: I do not agree with the Green party, that Finland should join because it 
has an impact elsewhere. In my view, landmines have national, political and historical symbolic and practical 
value. It is also a question of money and expenses.  
2
 PTK 87/2001, 34: Esa Lahtela: Apparently there have been skilled lobbyists at Ottawa, gun manufacturers, 
who lobbied representatives so they could sell new weapons. We have to understand this in Finland, so we do 
not fall into this trap. This would create arms race, because weapons are replaced with different kinds of 
efficient systems. Because of this, the Greens should come to that group, who want to abandon automatic 
weapons. Those are used for attacking. Mines are for defense.  
3
 PTK 87/2001: Matti Vähänäkki: In my opinion, Finland should, as for now, abstain from joining the landmines 
treaty. Circumstances in Finland, with vast forests and many lakes do not pose danger. Our country’s tradition 
is to evacuate civilian populations away from the battle zones in an early stage.   
4
 PTK 89/2001, 17: Esa Lahtela: Behind the mine ban is the military industrial lobby. 
5
 PTK 89/2001, 25: Matti Saari: Landmines are cheap and defensive weapon system. It would be useful to 
negotiate an exception for us in the use of landmines.  
6
 PTK 89/2001, 27: Antero Kekkonen: Comparing chemical weapons to landmines is unjustified. Chemical 
weapons are not defensive weapons like landmines are. 
7
 PTK 87/2001, 30: Jukka Gustafsson: I do not agree with the Green party, that Finland should join because it 
has an impact elsewhere. In my view, landmines have national, political and historical symbolic and practical 
value. It is also a question of money and expenses. 
8
 PTK 87/2001, 87: Sakari Smeds: New weapon systems that would replace already existing mines would be 
costly. Citizens would rather want these fund be spent on healthcare or on the education of our children. 
9
 PTK 87/2001, 86: Piia Viitanen: … When this summer I started Harry potter books, there was a magic mirror 
which showed the world as the viewer would want it to be, not like it is. After this debate, if I would go in front 
of the mirror, I would see a world where there would not be any guns, no missile systems, and no landmines. 
10
 PTK 87/2001, 8: Antero Kekkonen: Social Democratic Parliamentary Group views that Finland, in accordance 
with the Finnish policy of supporting international disarmament and humanitarian co-operation, has to join the 
Ottawa Treaty as soon as possible. 
11
 PTK 87/2001, 60-62: Ilkka Taipale: Soon 40 years as a member of the Committee of Hunred I have followed 
this cultural change and trying to promote it. 60’s generation placed their will against their fathers in an 
attempt to promote non-violent culture across generations. […] National Defense Doctrine has taken 
realistic approach to landmines. They will be abandoned. This has not happened voluntarily 
anywhere in the world, but as a result of wide ranging civil campaign.  
12
 PTK 87/2001, 8: Antero Kekkonen: Social Democratic Parliamentary Group views that Finland, in accordance 
with the Finnish policy of supporting international disarmament and humanitarian co-operation, has to join the 
Ottawa Treaty as soon as possible. 
13
 PTK 89/2001, 25 - 26: Kimmo Kiljunen:The bigger question in the landmines case is that it is tied into 
international agreement framework, to the Ottawa Convention, where over hundred states have already 
committed themselves. In international disarmament one cannot begin from the assumption that the weapon 
is strategically important to some country, if this assumption is made, international disarmament is impossible. 
I have just visited Iraq for example, and one could imagine Saddam Hussein to argue that biological weapons 
are strategically important for Iraq.  
14
 PTK 87/2001, 50: Jaakko Laakso: Landmines have been and still are important segment of our defense ability. 
Finland has used, and is planning to use, landmines responsibly. Like I stated, when Ottawa Treaty was signed 
and Sweden among the first ones was signing it, Washington Post wrote, that it is easy to do, because Finland is 
Sweden’s landmine. It is thus hard to agree on strict deadlines on joining the treaty when we do not have 
systems that would credibly replace landmines, or money to create those systems. 
15
 PTK 87/2001, 17: Outi Ojala: Left Alliance regrets, that our country has not joined the treaty like 140 other 
countries have done. 
16
 PTK 87/2001, 37: Annika Lapintie: Good neighborly relations and disarmament are much more efficient [than 
spending more money], and defense policy should concentrate on this much more. Because of this, I feel it is 
very important that joining the Ottawa treaty in 2006 will be binding.  
17
 PTK 87/2001, 14-15: Ilkka Kanerva: System that would replace antipersonnel landmines would be very 
expensive. There will not be sufficient funds to replace the current system in the coming years. Finland should 
not commit itself to strict deadlines, because there is not enough political will to allocate more money. Finland 
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cannot afford to abandon landmines without endangering its defense. Landmines are for defense and very 
useful in a country such as Finland.  
18
 PTK 87/2001, 31, Olli Nepponen: It is a pleasure to support previous speaker’s opinion about landmines 
(Gustafsson/SDP). Credible defense requires [landmines]. Money that is needed to replace them is so grand, 
that it cannot be found. 
19
 PTK 87/2001, 33: Eero Akaan-Penttilä: I absolutely cannot undertand, how Finnish people could abandon 
them [landmines]. Our GDP is the smallest of the Nordic Countries. In a matter of fact we have the longest 
border to the East, and vice versa, our defense budgets relation to our GDP, if compared to Sweden and 
Norway.  
20
 PTK 87/2001: Riitta Korhonen: For Finland, antipersonnel landmines are defensive weapon that Finland 
keeps in warehouses and used only in a situation where Finland needs to defend against aggression. 
Investment of 4 milliard to destroy landmines in this economic situation is unrealistic.  
21
 PTK 87/2001, 101: Pekka Ravi: In principle, it is good that Finland is supporting efficient and global ban for 
landmines. However, we must first investigate how can we replace this, in the case of enemy intrusion, very 
important aspect of our territorial defense, and can we really afford to fill the hole that abandoning them 
would create. 
22
 PTK 87/2001, 33Eero Akaan-Penttilä: I absolutely cannot understand, how Finnish people could abandon 
them [landmines]. : Our GDP is the smallest of the Nordic Countries. In a matter of fact we have the longest 
border to the East, and vice versa, our defense budgets relation to our GDP, if compared to Sweden and 
Norway.  
23
 PTK 87/2001, 14-15: Ilkka Kanerva: System that would replace antipersonnel landmines would be very 
expensive. There will not be sufficient funds to replace the current system in the coming years. Finland should 
not commit itself to strict deadlines, because there is not enough political will to allocate more money. Finland 
cannot afford to abandon landmines without endangering its defense. Landmines are for defense and very 
useful in a country such as Finland. 
24
 PTK 87/2001, 31, Olli Nepponen: It is a pleasure to support previous speaker’s opinion about landmines 
(Gustafsson/SDP). Credible defense requires [landmines]. Money that is needed to replace them is so grand, 
that it cannot be found. 
25
 PTK 87/2001, 57: Juha Karpio: In our country, mines have been used only during war and they have been 
swiped of afterwards and there have been no casualties during peace. Landmines are still the cheapest way to 
slow the enemy down. 
26
 PTK 87/2001, 66: Jyrki Katainen: Landmine ban sound in fact more noble that it is, especially because it does 
not treat different parts of the world equally. Like NCP group statement point out, in Finland there is no single 
mine on the ground, they are in warehouses. … it would be very unlikely to find political will in the parliament 
to increase defense budget to fund replacing systems. According to some estimates, the replacing system 
would cost even four milliard Finnish marks.  
27
 PTK 87/2001: Riitta Korhonen: For Finland, antipersonnel landmines are defensive weapon that Finland 
keeps in warehouses and used only in a situation where Finland needs to defend against aggression. Investing 
four milliard, to destroy landmines in this economic situation, is unrealistic.  
28
 PTK 87/2001, 101: Pekka Ravi: In principle, it is good that Finland is supporting efficient and global ban for 
landmines. However, we must first investigate how we could replace this, in the case of enemy intrusion, very 
important aspect of our territorial defense, and can we really afford to fill the hole that abandoning them 
would create. 
29
 PTK 89/2991, 16: Seppo Kanerva: Mines cannot be abandoned without replacing system. Like is apparent 
from the statements of others, we can see clearly that we cannot abandon them because there is no money. 
30
 PTK 87/2001, 30: Ulla Anttila: Greens support the signing of the Landmines treaty. The question is not what 
happens at the border, meaning that nothing happens, but the issue is, that if Finland signs the treaty, it has 
great impact on those countries, where this question is a problem. Landmines destroy human life all around 
the world, and if the international community cannot promote the treaty systematically, it sets an bad example 
to those countries, which do not follow the basic principles of the treaty in practice. Thus, in my opinion, 
signing of the treaty, and that the government has a positive stance on it, will have very positive impact 
internationally. 
31
 PTK 87/2001, 39: Ulla Anttila: About landmines, I must state, that the treaty is very important in connection 
to other kind of disarmament. This must not be forgotten.  
32
 PTK 87/2001,77-78: Anni Sinnemmäki: On the other hand, joining the Ottawa treaty is important in the 
respect of universalizing this treaty, to get it worldwide. In addition, some brought up, that we could ban all 
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kinds of other weapons. I agree that disarmament in general is a good thing, and this is one of those issues. 
Thus, Finland should join the treaty because it is the only real way to support it.  
33
 PTK 87/2001, 28: Defense Minister Jan-Erik Enestam: As in my previous speech was stated, the goal is to join 
the treaty by the year 2006 and disarm the landmines by the year 2010, without jeopardizing our defense 
ability. This is very obvious constraint… Replacement systems are very expensive. 
34
 PTK 87/2001, 28: Defense Minister Jan-Erik Enestam: As in my previous speech was stated, the goal is to join 
the treaty by the year 2006 and disarm the landmines by the year 2010, without jeopardizing our defense 
ability. This is very obvious constraint… Replacement systems are very expensive. 
35
 PTK 87/2001, 3: Defense Minister Jan-Erik Enestam: Finland supports efficient and global ban for 
antipersonnel landmines in accordance with the goals of the Ottawa Treaty. 
36
 PTK 87/2001, 24: Ismo Seivästö: Replacing antipersonnel landmines would cost 4 to 5 milliard, and there is 
no such money right now. Finland should join Ottawa treaty in the long run, not in a rush. 
37
 PTK 87/2001, 9: Juha Korkeaoja: The opinion of the Center Party is that a statement abandoning 
antipersonnel landmines should not be made because there are no plans, fiscal or other, on how to replace this 
central element of territorial defense.  
38
 PTK 87/2001, 32: Mirja Ryynänen: I think international pressures have been strongly over exaggerated.  
39
 PTK 87/2001, 64: Markku Rossi: I am exact opposite of MP Taipale. There is no reason for Finland to join the 
Ottawa treaty, not even in a long run, at least not during this decade. We need landmines also for defense. 
Finland has long borders and it means very much. No country will downgrade Finland if it will not join the 
Ottawa Treaty. 
40
 PKT 87/2001, 99: Lauri Oinonen: Still, there is no reason to sign the Ottawa treaty, because the treaty’s 
conditions do not fulfill even beyond our borders. From the vantage point of Finland’s defense, especially 
territorial one, mines are efficient, cheap, domestic and 100 percent safe defensive weapon. 
41
 PTK 89, 2001: Mauri Salo: Credible defence in the whole country is a guarantor of peace at our borders. 
When we make sure that landmines, which are in warehouses at the moment, can be placed quickly, it also 
gives as feeling of safety.  
42
 PTK 89/2001: 34: Lauri Oinonen: Finland cannot afford to abandon landmines, they are necessary. I would 
like to specify my point made last time on how Finland could do international PR. Finland is in the top when it 
comes to mine sweeping. Finland could get international points with this, not by signing a treaty, which is 
impossible to us, like the Ottawa Treaty is.  
43
 PTK 89/2001, 38: Kari Myllyniemi: Finland can never abandon landmines. Even talking about it reduces the 
perception that Finland is willing to defend its territory with all the means necessary. Mines cannot be even 
replaced, and it would even cost at least 4 to 5 milliard marks.  
44
 ERROR 
45
 PTK 87/2001, 56: Aulis Ranta-Muotio: Landmines are cheap weapon that are used only in a real need against 
attacking enemy and during peace mines are in warehouse. It is better to be active in mine sweeping, than to 
join the treaty after the fact. 
46
 PTK 89/2001, 38: Kari Myllyniemi: Finland can never abandon landmines. Even talking about it reduces the 
perception that Finland is willing to defend its territory with all the means necessary. Mines cannot be even 
replaced, and it would even cost at least 4 to 5 milliard marks.  
47
 PTK 87/2001, 26: Raimo Vistbacka: Finland has a very long border with Russia, border, which no other EU 
country yet have. If landmines would be abandoned, it would require expensive border monitoring system that 
would cover the whole long border. The price of such would be several milliard Finnish Marks.  
48
 PTK 87/2001, 26: Raimo Vistbacka: Finland has a very long border with Russia, border, which no other EU 
country yet have. If landmines would be abandoned, it would require expensive border monitoring system that 
would cover the whole long border. The price of such would be several milliard Finnish Marks.  
49
 PTK 97/2004, 43: Pekka Vilkuna: About the mine question: absolutely we are too hygienic, we are more 
sacred that Pope himself. Those mines are not endangering anybody when they are in stock and big countries 
aren’t in the treaty at all. 
50
 PTK 97/2004, 72: Lauri Oinonen: Our territorial defence ability detoriarates if we abandon landmines. The 
attacker can come with a triple speed, when antipersonnel landmines are not guarding other mines. 
51
 PTK 97/2004, 96: Lauri Oinonen: I fully understand the humanitarian ideas that are born when one sees mine 
shredder limbs, but they are not caused by Finnish mines. We know our mines are locked away. Because of this 
I see it necessary to ponder this question rationally, but also to think do we have reasons to spend the money 
on replacing systems, we could instead allocate the money to somewhere else.  
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52
 PTK 97/2004, 74: Rauno Kettunen:  Because our eastern neighbor or the USA has not signed the treaty, we 
should have also abstained. However, the line of the government should be viewed as a positive signal to other 
countries outside the Ottawa Treaty. The decision is in line with our long standing international humanitarian 
policy.  
53
 PTK 97/2004, 6: PM Matti Vanhanen: Finland joins the Landmines banning Ottawa Treaty in the year 2012. 
This will mean that landmines will be given away by the end of 2016. Replacing systems will be acquired during 
the years 2009-2016. Already in previous security and defense strategy guided to this direction. Now joining 
will get a concrete date and a decision will be made for to its approval.  
54
 PTK 97/2004, 10-11: Kauko Juhantalo: (Group statement) Public debate has concentrated especially on 
landmines and Nato option. Landmines have been integral part of our defense. International responsibilities 
however require us to join the Ottawa landmines Treaty, based on the timeframe agreed upon here. Wide 
ranging conversation on the issue has been beneficial. Based on rational arguments the timeframe, that also 
National Coalition Party during the last government agreed upon, of joining has been postponed nearly ten 
years. Even more could have been afforded. To replace landmines the Defense Forces will get additional 200 
million euros.  
55
 PTK 97/2004, 33: PM Matti Vanhanen: Foreign and security policy should not be conducted so that now one 
decision is made, but later will be said that after next elections it will change. Every time a decision is made, it 
will be in force. This kind on continuity one could wish also in this hard landmines question, in which we have 
lined our action in  1997 and 2001. We have given a clear signal from Finland what is our goal.  
56
 PTK 97/2004, 44: PM Matti vanhanen: I have told without contradictions, that when last time a goal was set, 
now we make a clear decision and define what are the consequences.  
57
 PTK 97/2004, 45: Olavi Ala-Nissilä: Offcourse consistency is important in foreign and security policy in the 
parliament also for the big parties.  
58
 PTK 97/2004: Aulis Ranta-Muotio: There has been no contradiction in this proposal in connection to mines. 
We just thought the time frame is too quick, so that we could have joined in 2006 and give away the mines in 
2010. 
59
 PTK 97/2004, 58: Antti Rantakangas: It has been good, that the history of this decision has been brought up. 
In the last policy in 2001, the last government made a decision, that was also supported by NCP, that Finland 
will join the Ottawa Treaty in 2006 and mines would be given away in 2012 [wrong date]. This was not a weak 
promise, as MP Zyskowitch has depicted, but a clear goal of the government, The current line is a good 
compromise. Ottawa treaty will be joined in 2012, and mines given away in 2016.  
60
 PTK 98/2004, 40: Klaus Pentti: By doing this decision we respect contracts made earlier, but prolong the 
accession date, which is good economically and for seeking replacement systems.  
61
 PTK 97/2004, 87: Tero Rönni: Our economic situation will be tough in the future, so I cannot agree on the 
increase of the defence budget. Mines should be where they are now, and let them be outdated on their own. 
There are all kinds of Kioto’s and Ottawa’s which we have signed among the first wave without looking 
carefully what we are doing.  
62
 PTK 97/2004, 11 Liisa Jaakonsaari: (Group Statement) It is good, that the decision is done. Finland has 
represented itself as an advocate for the mine ban for over seven year In international forums. It would be 
contradictory to act otherwise. 
63
 PTK 97/2004, 35: Liisa Jaakonsaari: To the NCP I would like to say, that you have continuously argued that 
there is no reason to be worried about what is thought of us abroad. Obviously there is not. But from what one 
should be worried about is that if Finnish politics is not consistent. Finland has consistently driven the landmine 
ban, because of this it is upmost important that the government has come to this decision. The question is 
about the consistency of policy.  
64
 PTK 97/2004, 40: FM Erkki Tuomioja: In my opinion we have after long internal talks arrived at a time frame 
which is realistic, fundable and also preserves the consistency of Finland’s policy. Luckily that consistency is no 
longer in the hands of NCP which has changed its views drastically.  
65
 PTK 97/2004: Liisa Jaakonsaari: What has stayed unclear is NCPs mine policy because example from 
Zyscowicz’s statement it is clear that NCP is against the Ottawa Treaty. This is very inconsistent if you have 
been involved in a policy for the past seven years which has driven mine ban. 
66
 PTK 97/2004, 59: Lauri Kähkönen: The decision to postpone the mine ban is a just compromise.  
67
 PTK 97/2004, 93: Arto Seppälä: Respecting national decisions is an important issue in respect to the official 
image of Finland. 
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68
 PTK 98/2004, 29: Kalevi olin: My own interest is precisely the one that was pointed to the FM: what is the 
foreign policy viewpoint of this issue, because we are viewed as very reliable, small country, which is reliable 
contracting partner in international arena. 
69
 PTK 97/2004, 36: Ben Zyskowicz: Landmines are necessary and beneficial defensive weapons. They 
strengthen our national security and are locked away during peace. Even in the times of crisis, the only ones 
who will step on them is the enemy soldier. I do not agree with the line of the government. It is said that this 
decision is necessary for the reputation of Finland. I do not understand, that if the scale balances between 
national security and reputation, that the reputation would weight more.  
70
 PTK 97/2004, 60: Jere Lahti: In the interim report of 2003 by the Ministry of Defence it was stated that in a 
military sense landmines are good defence strategy that is based on a conscription army because they are 
simple and cheap. If however in the future the threat models change, that we are not faced with the danger of 
wide scale attack, then landmines become obsolete. This kind of change has not happened. The threat of wide 
scale attack has decreased but is still possible.  
71
 PTK 97/2004, 66: The decision to ban mines showed that our political system is capable of making decisions 
that are not beneficial for Finland.  There are no arguments that make sense from the vantage point of defence 
policy, and the foreign policy justifications are at least weak. In other words, the decision was completely 
political. Mines are the single most important part of our defence because our long border cannot be efficiently 
defended without allocating more money and soldiers than is possible to get. From the vantage point of foreign 
policy mine ban could be understood if there would be detrimental effects to our foreign relations. There is 
however no such effect, not at least in such a scale that we must react to it. The effects of foreign policy is hard 
to measure, because everybody looks at the issue from the view point of their constituency. President 
Halonen’s constituency seems to be consisting of peace activists, who would rather see unilateral disarmament 
without replacing systems.   
72
 PTK 97/2004, 70: Eero Akaan-Penttilä: Landmines are not out dated defensive weapons in the Finnish terrain. 
It is a good weapon in a territorial defence and safeguards the troops.   
73
 PTK 97/2004, 73: Reijo Paananen: It the mine debate I wonder why we are abandoning, in relation to its 
costs, the wordls most effective weapon to deter enemy attack. According to calculation mine ban will cost 
anout 300 000 million euros. Is it wise to change totally working and cost efficient defence system? 
74
 PTK 97/2004, 91: Juhani Sjöblom: Landmine ban has been proved to be nationally unnecessary several times 
during the past years. Finland is civilized user of mines.in that respect we are a positive exception among the 
countries who are outside of the Ottawa Convention.  
75
 PTK 98/2004, 13, Eero Akaan Penttilä: Akaan-Penttilä cites mine report: “Mine weapons is very cost efficient 
weapons, because in our conditions it slows down the operative forces of more advanced militaries.” 
76
 PTK 98/2004, 20: Petri Salo: Finland’s defence hasn’t at decreased least during the time that we have spent 
outside the Ottawa Treaty. Despite the international pressure we have kept weapon system that is appropriate 
in a military sense.  
77
 PTK 98/2004, 22: Tuija Nurmi: Mines are poor nations defensive weapon, not a weapon of aggression. 
78
 PTK 98/2004, 37: Marja Tiura: it is understandable that those EU countries shich are surrounded by sea or 
other NATO countries are willing to abandon mines, but Finland has long border with Russia. We cannot 
replace mines with a weapon system that is as cheap and effective. Don’t we have better use for the 300 
million euros? 
79
 PTK 98/2004, 39: Pertti Hemmilä: Anywhere in the world it will be understood if we stay out of Ottawa 
because of our history and geographic location.  
80
 PTK 98/2004, 40: Marjukka Karttunen: How Finland’s reputation would suffer if we would choose not to join 
Ottawa Convnention and left landmines outdate on their own? Our international reputation would actually 
benefit from not joining, because we need to have a credible defence.  
81
 PTK 97/2004, 15-17: Jyrki Katainen: One of the most publicly discussed decisions made in the strategy is the 
governments stand on Finland joining the Ottawa Landmines Treaty by the year 2012. This decision is not 
supported by the parliamentary group of NCP. In our opinion Finland should join the Ottawa treaty earliest by 
the year 2020. Mines can be given away when their ignitions have out dated and there is certainty on replacing 
system which will be as cheap. There is no rationality in replacing working system and pay over 300 million 
euros just because some Finns have experienced that this is beneficial for our country’s reputation. The central 
argument for joining, that Finland’s reputation would suffer, has not been able to verify. PM Vanhanen himself 
few weeks ago in the parliament mentioned, that Finnish mine policy does not stir any meaningful 
international interest. 
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82
 PTK 97/2004, 60: Jere Lahti: In the interim report of 2003 by the Ministry of Defence it was stated that in a 
military sense landmines are good defence strategy that is based on a conscription army because they are 
simple and cheap. If however in the future the threat models change, that we are not faced with the danger of 
wide scale attack, then landmines become obsolete. This kind of change has not happened. The threat of wide 
scale attack has decreased but is still possible.  
83
 PTK 97/2004, 42: Jyrki Katainen: What comes to NCPs mine stance, if you read the last national defense 
strategy, it can easily be read that It stated there is no economic or technical options to replace mines at the 
moment, and those options have not widened in any rational or realistic way. This is why NCP proposes the 
deadline to be postpones to 2020 at the earliest.  
84
 PTK 97/2004, 73: Reijo Paananen: It the mine debate I wonder why we are abandoning, in relation to its 
costs, the wordls most effective weapon to deter enemy attack. According to calculation mine ban will cost 
anout 300 000 million euros. Is it wise to change totally working and cost efficient defence system? 
85
 PTK 98/2004, 15: Jan Vapaavuori: Finland should not join the Ottawa Treaty at least as long as the ignitions 
haven’t outdated, meaning somewhere in the 2020s. If the current President has pushed mine ban even before 
the Ottawa Treaty had established, it is not good enough argument for joining. It is not sufficient reason to 
spend the money of the tax payers.  
86
 PTK 98/2004, 32: Arto Satonen: I wish that the parliament could reason independently in reversing this 
decision. It is totally unacceptable to spend tax payer’s money only to polish our image. We could build 
hundreds of nursing homes or fix schools with this money. The pressure we face is minimal.  
87
 PTK 98/2004, 37: Marja Tiura: it is understandable that those EU countries shich are surrounded by sea or 
other NATO countries are willing to abandon mines, but Finland has long border with Russia. We cannot 
replace mines with a weapon system that is as cheap and effective. Don’t we have better use for the 300 
million euros? 
88
 PTK 97/2004, 50-51: Olli Nepponen: Government has brough to the table clear and consistent brief. There is 
nothing surprising because these questions have been lined both in the parliament and public debate. Shortly 
on the landmines: In the last policy it was stated that the time frame is too fast. I would like to remind however 
that Finland made a commitment not to produce more mines in 1997.  
89
 PTK 98/2004: Olli Nepponen: Mines are outdating and they have to be replaced sooner or later. We have 
bound ourselves in 1997 to a treaty that states that we can no longer produce or buy more landmines. 
90
 PTK 97/2004, 56: Sari Essayah: Landmines are a defensive weapon, they cannot be used for attacking, so they 
woul seem to suit Finlands defence doctrine that is based of regional defence.  
91
 PTK 97/2004, 25: Bjarne Kallis (ryhmäpuheenvuoro) In my opinion the speaker of the house, General 
Häggluns and partly also prime minister have clearly stated that this does not stir as wide international 
opposition as it has been stated earlier, that Finland would have been criticized when we have not joined the 
Ottawa treaty. Argument has also been that landmines will out date. But as is now clear, that we are not 
criticized, and the mines do not outdate, the ignitions do but are easily replaced, it raises the question why are 
we so vulnerable to small criticism that we are willing to throw 200 to 300 million euros away. The mines are in 
stock, they are not threatening anybody. Can we really afford to give away weapons, that will cost 200 to 300 
million euros? 
92
 PTK 97/2004, 64: Leena Rauhala: For me the dates are not as important as the costs. I would rarhter see that 
those hundreds of millions that are used for replacing systems would be spent otherwise.  
93
 PTK 98/2004: Ulla Anttila, 28: I wish that FM Tuomioja could handle this issue from the viewpoint of foreign 
policy. It is understandable that DF Kääriäinen sees this issue as a defence issue, but I would see it important 
that Finland joins according to the time table agreed by previous government, meaning to join in 2006 and 
abolish in 2010. 
94
 PTK 97/2004, 28: Tony Halme: In principle this means that both USA and Russia should be part of the treaty 
when Finland starts to destroy landmines and replace them with other weapon systems. We do not have any 
reason to sacrifice hundreds of millions if there are masses of landmines only few kilometers away from the 
state border. 
95
 PTK 97/2004, 28: Tony Halme: In principle this means that both USA and Russia should be part of the treaty 
when Finland starts to destroy landmines and replace them with other weapon systems. We do not have any 
reason to sacrifice hundreds of millions if there are masses of landmines only few kilometers away from the 
state border. 
96
 PTK 97/2004, 16: Suvi-Anne Siimes: The conslusions that are made from the analysis are following their own 
paths. They are still very national and defense oriented. For example in the case of mines, the humanitarian 
goals of Ottawa treaty are lost fully, and the vantage point is only as long as our eastern border.  
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97
 PTK 97/2004, 47: Erkki Virtanen: Secondly, if mines would not be dangerous, why then the Ottawa Treaty has 
been made? 
98
 PTK 87/2004, 84: Pentti Tiusanen: MP Lahtela, go and visit a Orthopedic Hospital near Kabul and its 
prosthetic workshop. I went there in 2000, and it was a horrific sight: people, who did not have upper or lower 
body parts, five year old without legs, mother that had no hand, all done by mines. We cannot think that we 
make a treaty where is N countries minus Finland.  
99
 PTK 97/2004, 88: Erkki Virtanen: My understanding is that the basis of the treaty is the general 
understanding that it would be good for the world and for the people if there would be no mines that people 
could without their consent to step on.  
100
 PTK 97/2004, 36: Outi Ojala: First off, to MP Zyskowicz and NCP: You should introduce yourself to the 
statement of the Head of the ICRC published in Suomen Kuvalehti, where is stated that those countries who are 
outside of the Ottawa Treaty are giving justification to others around the globe to use landmines.  
101
 PTK 87/2004, 84: Pentti Tiusanen: MP Lahtela, go and visit a Orthopedic Hospital near Kabul and its 
prosthetic workshop. I went there in 2000, and it was a horrific sight: people, who did not have upper or lower 
body parts, five year old without legs, mother that had no hand, all done by mines. We cannot think that we 
make a treaty where is N countries minus Finland.  
102
 PTK 27/2011, 5: Janne Sankelo: Accorsing to a study by the Defence Forces, the landmine ban will mean 
increases in the attacking speed of the enemy and in the casualty rates of our own troops. Landmines can be 
and has been replaced with other systems. However, because the full funding that was promised has not been 
actualized, it has led to a situation in which the Defence Forces have had to cut their other functions.  
103
 PTK 27/2011, 16: Pauli Kiuru: If history teaches us something it is that naivety is not the way things should 
be handled. In the 1930s weapons acquisition was mishandled and that mistake was paid with Finnish blood. 
After that we have learned something and bought weapons, but now we are unilaterally abandoning these.  I 
agree with MP Sasi and Satonen. 
104
 PTK 27/2011, 23: Heikki Autto: The number of victims caused by landmines has decreased from 25 000 
yearly from 1990s to 4000 in 2009 according to organizations that deal with the issue. This has happened 
without Finland. I repeat, this has happened without Finland being part of Ottawa treaty. Joining would 
concretely only impact Finnish defence. Is this consequence acceptable because of some assumed and 
controversial image gain? My own stance as a Finnish man, officer in the reserve and member of the 
parliament is, that it is not acceptable. 
105
 PTK 27/2011, 25: Jukka Kopra: Finland’s decision to join the Ottawa will lower the threshold of militarily 
intervene on our issues. This is a fact.  
106
 PTK 27/2011, 14: Heikki Autto: I would like to read from FSDP 2009 [cite the plans about increasing defence 
budget by 2% annually). Now when we know these increases will not be made, there is no foundation to bring 
forth past decision.  
107
 PTK 27/2011, 15: Kimmo Sasi: Foreign and security policy needs to be consistent and the premise to this 
decision has been given in 2004. However politics must follow time. Defence forces are facing great budgetary 
constraints and it justifies to consider this situation, and then in the dialogue between government and 
parliament to think if the time frame should be further adjusted. MP Johannes Koskinen brought up the date of 
2020 would be good.  
108
 PTK 27/2011, 8: Ben Zyskowicz: On Tuesday 13
th
 of April 2004 I said the following: “Like it has been said, 
only enemy soldier will step on Finnish mines, and when we need them because of our security and defence, 
we should no give them away.” However the government of Matti Vanhanen, led by the CP, decided in 2004 to 
join the treaty. This has been decided again in 2009, so my own view is that the train has passed the station in 
this issue matter. Finland’s foreign policy needs to be consistent and predictable, and I don’t see that we could 
make a u-turn on this one. The original decision made by the government of Vanhanen was a wrong one.  
109
 PTK 27/2011, 11: Ben Zyskowicz: When it comes to Finland’s reputation, in the year 2004 Finland had not 
yet constrained itself to the Ottawa Treaty, so we saw that Finland reputation could not be endangered. It is 
completely different situation now. Finnish government has made this decision wtice, that Finland is on board. 
If we would make a u-turn, it would have a different meaning.  
110
 PTK 27/2011, 9: Jouni Backman: This is a strance discussion. Now when we are fulfilling decision that have 
been made with varying coalitions in 2004 and 2009 – the first had SDP the second didn’t – old coalition 
partners are reversing their own decisions, not to even mention MP Soini whose own troops are backing away 
behind their own General.  
111
 PTK 27/2011, 12: Johannes Koskinen: It has been acknowledged many times, that this decision has been 
made two times with a wide consensus.  
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112
 PTK 27/2011, 8: Annika Lapintie: In my opinion it is good to remember that this international agreement has 
started from a premise that landmines, anti personnel mines, do not separate civilians from soldiers, but 
around the globe 4000 people have died last year even when this agreement has been in force since 1999. 156 
countries in the world have signed this treaty just because of these humanitarian reasons.  
113
 PTK 27/2011, 13: Erkki Virtanen: Ottawa treaty has been made because of humanitarian reasons. Landmines 
are – elsewhere than Finland, here they do not pose danger  – one of the most tragic weapons for civilians and 
especially children.  
114
 PTK 27/2011, 17: Annika Lapintie: This is really strange that we speak about unilateral disarmament when 
156 countries have joined a convention precisely because landmines are a humanitarian problem – because 
they kill women and children who are fetching water. 
115
 PTK 27/2011, 19: Annika Lapintie: Ottawa Convention entered into force already in 1999. 156 countries have 
ratified the treaty. There are only 40 countries outside and Finland is the only EU country who has not signed 
the treaty. From all the European countries only Russia has kept landmines. Landmines are grave humanitarian 
problem. Civilized nation should not keep weapons that cause disproportionate suffering to civilians. The 
problem of landmines is that they do not separate soldiers and civilians but handicap people even decades 
after the conflict. 
116
 PTK 27/2011, 8: Annika Lapintie: In my opinion it is good to remember that this international agreement has 
started from a premise that landmines, anti personnel mines, do not separate civilians from soldiers, but 
around the globe 4000 people have died last year even when this agreement has been in force since 1999. 156 
countries in the world have signed this treaty just because of these humanitarian reasons.  
117
 PTK 27/2011, 10: Kari Uotila: Offcourse landmine issue is important and replacing systems need to be build 
but I would emphasize the idea of wider concept of security. Best security is acquired with rational and 
consistent foreign policy, not what kind of equipment we have at the border.  
118
 PTK 27/2011, 17: Annika Lapintie: This is really strange that we speak about unilateral disarmament when 
156 countries have joined a convention precisely because landmines are a humanitarian problem – because 
they kill women and children who are fetching water. 
119
 PTK 27/2011, 19: Annika Lapintie: Ottawa Convention entered into force already in 1999. 156 countries have 
ratified the treaty. There are only 40 countries outside and Finland is the only EU country who has not signed 
the treaty. From all the European countries only Russia has kept landmines. Landmines are grave humanitarian 
problem.  Despite the active use of landmines has almost ended, the Landmine Monitor reported in 2010 
almost 4000 mine victim. Seventy percent of these were civilians. Civilized nation should not keep weapons 
that cause disproportionate suffering to civilians. The problem of landmines is that they do not separate 
soldiers and civilians but handicap people even decades after the conflict. 
120
 PTK 27/2011, 14 - 15: Pekka Haavisto: My understanding is that the market share of landmines has started 
to diminish in those region where these problems are faced: some Asian countries, Caucasus, Africa. These 
regions normally don’t have money to spend, if they are used in asymmetric purposes – I mean groups and 
such – to obtain expensive replacement systems, and then this type of weapon, weapon type that is harmful 
for civilians, is not used – weapon type that is harmful to women and children. 
121
 PTK 27/2011, 21: Pekka Haavisto: I’m sure I am not the only one who has experience from mine fields. My 
experience is working six years for the UN in Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia and later in Afghanistan, where mines have 
been used. Mine maps are usually destroyed. It is impossible to sweep 100 percent of the mines. Civilians move 
mines to lands that belong to other ethnic minority. Children touch remnants of war. I would have hoped that 
the FM would have been here to talk about the issue of what it means to be a part of an international 
agreement. I believe that is has a huge impact on Finnish reputation. I believe that how we behave on 
international disarmament matters when we seek UN Security Council membership. We are followed in these 
matters. 
122
 PTK 27/2011, 8: Pekka Haavisto: I support the treaty and I see two issues here. First is the Finland’s 
responsibility in international disarmament and support of this. We are known as a country who has been 
active disarmament negotiatior noth in nuclear and conventional arms issues, and this has increased security in 
the world. Now when we have to abandon something ourselves, it has been problematic. In my opinion, in the 
name of consistency we have to take responsibility that sometimes we have to abandon some of our own 
weapons. Second is the national defence issue. I am sure that we will hear good arguments from our ministers 
this fall on how to modernize our military. 
123
 PTK 27/2011, 10: Anni Sinnemäki: In my opinion it is also important that Finland is reliable and credible 
negotiating partner in the international forums. This decision, to join the Ottawa Convention, has been made 
twice, like it has been already mentioned is this room.  
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124
 PTK 27/2011, 11: Anni Sinnemäki: Like it was apparent from the discussion between MP Zyskowics and 
Rantakangads, we cannot make international commitments that we change each time we have a new 
government in power. We are here talking about international commitment in which Finland is a part of 
building a world without landmines which have caused problems for thousands of people. Finland is finally 
taking it’s place among civilized countries and express its support for the victims of mines and also support 
other countries to join the treaty.  
125
 PTK 27/2011, 21: Pekka Haavisto: I’m sure I am not the only one who has experience from mine fields. My 
experience is working six years for the UN in Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia and later in Afghanistan, where mines have 
been used. Mine maps are usually destroyed. It is impossible to sweep 100 percent of the mines. Civilians move 
mines to lands that belong to other ethnic minority. Children touch remnants of war. I would have hoped that 
the FM would have been here to talk about the issue of what it means to be a part of an international 
agreement. I believe that is has a huge impact on Finnish reputation. I believe that how we behave on 
international disarmament matters when we seek UN Security Council membership. We are followed in these 
matters. 
126
 PTK 27/2011, 7: DM Stefan Wallin: In this issue matter, which belongs to the jurisprudence of the Foreign 
Ministry, who handles international treatys, is good to remember that the actual decision concerning the 
Ottawa Convention has been made two times in 2004 and again in 2009. In both cases it was made in 
connection to the FSDP. It was decided then, alreasy in 2004, that Finland will join this treaty in 2012. Now 
when the government proposal is here, the paper is political but also technical and consistent next step to 
those two past decisions. Also the issue here is the reputation of Finland. 156 countries have joined the treaty. 
From EU countries Finland is actually the only one who has not ratified the treaty – Poland has agreed on it but 
not yet ratified.  
127
 PTK 27/2011, 18: DM Stefan Wallin: This question is really also about how Finland as an international 
credible contracting partner presents itself.  
128
 PTK 27/2011, 9: Eero Reijonen: AP-landmines are defensive weapons which are cheap and efficient. This we 
should all remember. Experts have studied that from if looking at the economic cost and efficiency, landmines 
cannot be replaced. 
129
 PTK 27/2011, 20: Mikko Savola: Landmines are very efficient way to defend. Their purpose is not only harm 
the enemy but to guide them from a bad area to lines that are more easily defendable. It is in Finland’s interest 
to stay out of the Ottawa Treaty. 
130
 PTK 27/2011, 27: Timo V. Korhonen: At this moment, at this economic situation, when in the background 
looms spending cuts of 200 millions to our defence budget, it is not credible that mines can be replaced so that 
the whole country can be defended.  
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 PTK 27/2011, 9: Eero Reijonen: AP-landmines are defensive weapons which are cheap and efficient. This we 
should all remember. Experts have studied that from if looking at the cost and efficiency, landmines cannot be 
replaced. 
132
PTK 27/2011, 10: Antti Rantakangas: We should at least reconsider the timeframe of this decision in this 
economic situation. 2004 and 2009 was completely different situation economically and Finland had the 
opportunity to build credible replacing system.  
133
 PTK 27/2011, 13: Mikko Savola: In principle we have committed to the Ottawa Treaty. However now, as it 
has been emphasized, we must act according to the times.  Now that we know the economic situation and also 
spending cuts are made in Defence Forces we should understand that bad decision can also be reversed. This is 
the reason why we have a parliament and elections.  
134
 PTK 27/2011, 27: Timo V. Korhonen: At this moment, at this economic situation, when in the background 
looms spending cuts of 200 millions to our defence budget, it is not credible that mines can be replaced so that 
the whole country can be defended.  
135
 PTK 27/2011, 15: To MP Backman I would like to say that SDP has their own Commander in Chief, who 
surely has a big role in this treaty which the parliament has approved because we are consistent.  
136
 PTK 27/2011, 5: Lauri Oinonen: Every country should, as should Finland, think first what is best for their own 
country. The threat of an enemy attack is always present, and don’t we have an efficient defence system, which 
landmines are part of, because of that? 
137
 PTK 27/2011, 6: Tom Packalen: I can only ask that what price are we paying from this new Finlandization 
towards the west? How many of us have really thought of the consequences to our defence? Mines are a 
defensive weapon. The Ottawa Treaty and the consequences of it to our defence was one of the reasons I came 
into politics.  
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138
 PTK 27/2011, 9, Pertti Virtanen: Finland is the only country that has over thousand kilometers of border with 
Russia.  
139
 PTK 27/2011, 13-14: Ritva Elomaa: Landmines have been tailor made for Finland by defence experts. They 
are affordable way to maintain Finnish defence.  
140
 PTK 27/2011, 18: Jussi Niinistö: According to a survey made by Officer’s Union, ratifyin the Ottawa 
Convention will weaken our ability to defend the whole country. Landmines are not for attacking. They save 
lives and they create losses for the enemy,In addition, the psychological effects of mines, “mine horror”, is big. 
141
 PTK 27/2011, 20: Olli Immonen: Like MP Niinistö told earlier, landmines are economically efficient defensive 
weapons and replacing these at the moment is impossible. In addition there are only few defenders at the long 
border, which increases the importance of mines in this country. 
142
 PTK 27/2011, 22 – 23: Mika Niikko: Finland is a small country, and when taking into account our resources it 
is not smart to weaken the defences of an independent country in any way. Finland should not show solidarity 
by abandoning landmines.  
143
 PTK 27/2011, 24: Jussi Halla-Aho: Different issues have their costs and benefits. However, hiububg tge 
Ittawa treaty has only costs, and such decision should not be made. It is true that western, so called civilized, 
nation being outside the treaty is exceptional but so is Finland. Finland has a large territory and long border, 
but small economy and population. We need cheap systems that do not bind large numbers of manpower.  
144
 PTK 27/2011, 26: Juho Eerola: Finland should not join the Ottawa treaty. Mines are efficient and cheap and 
replacement systems will cost much more. No child will be injured because we are not in. 
145
 PTK 27/2011, 13-14: Ritva Elomaa: Landmines have been tailor made for Finland by defence experts. They 
are affordable way to maintain Finnish defence.  
146
 PTK 27/2011, 16: Reijo Hongisto: At the moment our economic situation is really constrained. If we would 
decide not to join the Ottawa treaty it would mean savings of over 200 million.  
147
 PTK 27/2011, 20: Olli Immonen: Like MP Niinistö told earlier, landmines are economically efficient defensive 
weapons and replacing these at the moment is impossible. In addition there are only few defenders at the long 
border, which increases the importance of mines in this country. 
148
 PTK 27/2011, 24: Jussi Halla-Aho: Different issues have their costs and benefits. However, hiububg tge 
Ittawa treaty has only costs, and such decision should not be made. It is true that western, so called civilized, 
nation being outside the treaty is exceptional but so is Finland. Finland has a large territory and long border, 
but small economy and population. We need cheap systems that do not bind large numbers of manpower.  
149
 PTK 27/2011, 25: Ari jalonen: Like I mentioned in the beginning, money is in large parts the issue here. This 
price tag conversation needs to  
150
 PTK 27/2011, 26: Juho Eerola: Finland should not join the Ottawa treaty. Mines are efficient and cheap and 
replacement systems will cost much more. No child will be injured because we are not in. 
